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As organizational security breaches increase, it becomes imperative to understand the 
factors that lead to these breaches and take the necessary steps to minimize threats. Since 
employees are considered the weakest link in ensuring the security of corporate data, this 
paper evaluates various employee characteristics (demographic, company-specific, and 
skills-based) to understand their relationship with security knowledge and likelihood of 
becoming a security breach victim. This paper accounts for four different, yet 
intertwined, security risk areas: phishing, passwords, BYOD and laptop usage in the 
organizational setting. Findings from a survey of 250 employees at a medium-sized US 
consulting firm identify higher-risk employees and evaluate the relationship between 
employee characteristics, understanding of security policies, and security risks. Based on 
these findings and separate interviews with security experts, the study concludes with a 
set of recommendations for companies to improve organizational security and reduce 
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Due to advancements in technology, companies nowadays store an increasingly large 
amount of personally identifiable information (PII) within their infrastructure, ranging 
from customers’ date of birth, social security number, and credit card information to 
health records and financial statements. With the cost of security breaches skyrocketing 
in recent years ($3.5 million on average per company in 2014—a 15% increase compared 
to 2013) [1], these companies also have an increasing need to secure the client and 
employee data they store. To obtain people’s PII or financial information, modern 
hackers try to find the easiest way to access companies’ networks without being detected. 
Instead of actively attacking the network, many opt for passive attacks that target 
company employees—companies’ “greatest asset and most vulnerable target” [5]—to 
access the network. That is, no matter how secure the computer system architecture is, it 
will only be as strong as its weakest link—the people accessing and interacting with the 
data [2]. It then comes to no surprise that three of the most prominent “human” 
vulnerabilities are also among the top ten security concerns for companies in 2015 [4, 5, 
6, 7, 8], including:  
1) Hackers’ use of advanced persistent threats (APT) that use social engineering 
techniques (phishing, spear phishing, etc.) to access the company network [4, 
10].  
2) Employees’ use of insecure passwords [6] 
3) Employees’ use of personal devices in an organizational setting (i.e., the “Bring 




Due to the existence of these threats and vulnerabilities, it is important to educate 
employees of their roles and responsibilities they have on keeping the organizations 
secure. Steve Durbin, a managing director of the Information Security Forum (ISF), 
points out that instead of mere security awareness programs on which companies spent 
millions of dollars in the past decade, “organizations need to make positive security 
behaviors part of the business process, transforming employees from risks into the first 
line of defense in the organization's security posture” [5]. 
 With this in mind, this thesis evaluates employees’ knowledge of and compliance 
with four areas of organizational security policies: (1) phishing, (2) password complexity, 
(3) the use of personal devices (BYOD), and (4) company-issued laptops in an 
organizational setting. The lack of knowledge in these areas on the employees’ end poses 
significant risks to the organizations, as those areas require human activity that cannot be 
as easily secured or controlled as an IT infrastructure. This study moves beyond existing 
research on organizational security because: 
1) It covers three1 of the most important vulnerabilities within the top ten security 
concerns for organizations in 2015; 
2) It provides a more holistic view of security threats organizations face by including 
perspectives from employees and security experts; 
3) It investigates employee awareness around these concepts and identifies what they 
see as the biggest risks to data security; and 
4) It makes recommendations for organizations to create a security-oriented culture 
among employees. 
 
                                                          
1 Company-issued devices (i.e. laptops) are not among the top 10 threats but are included in this study 
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To accomplish these goals, the following paper evaluates how demographic (sex, age, 
education), company-specific (employment time, job role, security training, industry 
sector) and skills-based factors (perceived Internet knowledge, perceived technical 
knowledge, perceived awareness of security concepts and security policy) affect (1) 
employees’ susceptibility of falling victim to a security threat, (2) actual knowledge of 
security terms and concepts and (3) actual knowledge of company’s security policies. 
 To derive to findings, the paper reviews the extant literature on cybersecurity 
broadly, as well as the three specific results from a multi-methodological study including 
a survey of employees at a mid-sized US consulting firm and interviews with leading 
security professionals and researchers. Based on the results of these analyses, the thesis 
concludes with a set of “best practices” for enhancing organizational security and 




2. Literature Review 
2.1 Cybersecurity Changes over Time 
Technological advancements over the past 20 years have resulted in dramatic 
increases in the volume of data transmitted over the Internet [11]. Similarly, 
technological advancements have shifted companies’ reliance on information technology 
from being a mean of system automation to become the crucial component of the 
companies’ business [11]. However, the rapid technological advancement was not 
followed by the same rapid advancement in security implementation which led 
organizations to become vulnerable to attacks [11]. One common mistake organizations 
often make is that they do not realize (by judging how much they spend on security) how 
much of their business relies on the technology until it is too late [12].  
Business-driven technological changes often impact security and drive security 
changes [7]. For example, in the 1990s, an increased demand for personal computing and 
storage led many IT organizations to standardize on a single platform, Windows, to 
reduce overhead [7]. Using a single platform, with its security vulnerabilities, had its 
drawbacks and eventually resulted in denial-of-service attacks in 2001-2003 timeframe 
[7]. Similarly, the demand to reduce costs and increase reach to a large customer base led 
to increases in companies using Internet-based technologies (e.g., email, company 
websites) for transmitting sensitive information [7]. Also, the demand for speed and 
quick retrieval of data led to hasty bug fixes without considering common vulnerabilities 
such as SQL injection and cross-site scripting [7]. This all has resulted in various security 
loopholes within organizational IT infrastructure that, in turn, makes phishing and similar 
attacks become common ways to attack the endpoints while staying undetected [7].  
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 Today, globalization of offices, the use of virtualization and cloud computing 
technology, mobility, and bring your own device (BYOD) policies further complicate the 
security landscape of an organization [10]. In modern organizations, employees are often 
geographically dispersed around the world, storing and sharing information on mobile 
phones and in the cloud. Unlike traditional security models, which focus on tightly 
defined boundaries [11], new models (virtualization, cloud computing, BYOD, etc.), 
extend traditional boundaries and complicate the security landscape as they “… cause 
breakage in our ability to control or monitor the flow of sensitive information into and 
out of the organization” [7]. Consequently, these newer methods for sharing data have 
increased convenience at the cost of creating a “target-rich” environment for hackers to 
cause security breaches [10]. That is why user education in security and the 
understanding of the roles and responsibilities users play in keeping organizations secure 
are of utmost importance for years ahead. As Paul Ferrillo points out: “Network security 
takes a village, involving every employee of the company. A culture of security needs to 
be instilled in every person touching a keyboard or a keypad” [12]. 
 With the amount of sensitive data that companies store and the evolution of the 
threat landscape from adolescent hackers to organized crime networks and state actor 
campaigns [17], security today has transformed to be “… a fundamental aspect that must 
be considered alongside all other core functions to ensure that the business can meet its 






2.2 Recent Events and Looking Ahead 
Based on a recent report from the Identity Theft Resource Center (ITRC), there 
were 783 reported data breaches in 2014—the highest number of data breaches reported 
ever [29]. This number marks a 27.5% increase compared to 2013 and an 18.3% increase 
compared to 2010, which previously held that record [29]. The report further shows that 
hacking has been a primary cause of data breach with the 8-year average of 21.7% [29].  
 
Figure 1: Data Breach Causes. Source: Identity Theft Resource Center [29] 
 
In a global analysis on the cost of data breaches in 2014, the Ponemon Institute found 
that the cost of data breaches per organization was highest in the U.S. at $5.85 million per 
organization, costing organizations on average $201 per stolen record [32]. At the time of 
the study, the U.S. had the highest number of records breached with an average of 29,087 
records per breach [32]. On the causes of data breaches in U.S. in 2014, research found 
that 44% were due malicious or criminal attacks, 31% due to the human factor and 25% 
due to the system glitch [32]. Three factors that can decrease the cost of the data breaches 
are strong security posture, well-defined incident response plan, and appointment of a 
Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) [32].  
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 Twenty major data breaches in 2014 included famous retailers like Neiman 
Marcus, Michaels, UPS, PF Changs, Jimmy Johns’, Home Depot, Staples, Kmart, Bebe, 
and Sony [30]. While customers’ credit and debit card information was stolen for the 
majority of these breaches, Sony’s data breach exposed over 47,000 social security 
numbers, 15,000 of which were of current or former employees [30]. Hence, security 
professionals believe that Sony’s data breach should be an eye-opener for organizations 
to take cybersecurity seriously [12].  
 Among the top security concerns security professionals list for 2015 are four that 
will be discussed in this thesis. These include:  
1) Social engineering, including advanced persistent threats (APTs), targeted attacks, 
and spear phishing [4, 10] 
2) Insecure passwords [6] 
3) Mobility and Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) [4,5,7,8]2 
4) User education and engagement as it relates to the above mentioned concerns [5, 
9, 12] 
Each of these concerns are described in more detail below. 
2.2.1 Social Engineering 
Advanced persistent threats (APT) are among the biggest concerns for 
organizations as they start with a hacker’s use of social engineering techniques to gain 
access to the corporate network [10]. Social engineering attacks are: 
“… security exploits that prey on the vulnerable attributes of humans rather than 
of technology. They stem from the fact that some criminals have found it easier to 
obtain the information needed to execute illegal activities from the people that 
operate the computers via some sort of social interaction than it is from the 
computers themselves” [14].  
                                                          
2 Company-issued devices (i.e. laptops) are not among the top threats but are included in this study 
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 One example of social engineering is an exploit known as “Techie Talk” [15, 31]. 
This involves the “attacker” calling a low-level company employee and posing as a 
member of the technical support team, help desk, or a software maintenance company. 
The attacker alerts the employee to a “technical problem” that requires login credentials 
to fix. If successful, the attacker will be able to quickly access the company’s network. 
Other common forms of social engineering are phishing and spear-phishing attacks [15], 
which are discussed below.  
Jagatic and colleagues define phishing as: 
“…a form of deception in which an attacker attempts to fraudulently acquire 
sensitive information from a victim by impersonating a trustworthy entity… These 
attacks usually come in the form of an email that is transmitted to many different 
individuals that are unknown to the attacker under the guise of a notice from a 
large financial institution, online marketing firm, or a popular email site” [14].  
 
Unlike phishing, during which emails are sent to a wider population who may or may 
not be associated with the particular seemingly trustworthy entity, spear phishing (also 
known as context-based phishing) is an attack for which an attacker gains as much 
knowledge/context about the victim as possible prior to the attack by monitoring the 
victim’s website and email use; the goal is for the attacker to credibly pose as one of the 
entities the victim is associated with [18]. Spear phishing attacks are powerful because 
they are harder to decipher than regular attacks, especially when playing on the emotional 
side of the victims in situations that deal with causes that victims support (charity, 
disaster, etc.) [18].  
 Parrish, Bailey, and Courtney describe the three components of every phishing 
attack [14]. These are also depicted in Figure 2 below.  
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a) The hook –  email sent from a seemingly trustworthy entity with the goal to 
collect sensitive information 
b) The lure  - incentive (discounts, free offers, etc.) used to attract users to provide 
desired information to hackers 
c) The catch  - sensitive information that hackers wanted to obtain 
 
 
Figure 2: Phishing components analogy. Source: Security Cartoon [23] 
 
Both phishing and spear phishing attacks are on the rise, and experts believe they will 
continue to be a significant organizational threat in 2015 [12]. Symantec research shows a 
91% increase in spear phishing attacks from 2012 to 2013 [12] while Trend Micro found 
that 91% of cyber-attacks start with spear phishing [22]. As for the rising trend in 
phishing, the total number of phishing attacks in 2012 was 59% higher than in 2011 with 
over $1.5 billion spent globally in fraud damages [19]. Also, between Q4 2013 and Q1 
2014, phishing increased by 10.7% [20]. Phishing emails were the most common form of 
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social engineering attacks organizations experienced in 2012, constituting 47% of all 
attacks [16].   
 Phishing targets vary by industry sectors. The highest percentage of phishing 
attacks, during the second quarter of 2014, were in the payment services industry at 
39.8% followed by financial institutions at 20.2% [25]. The healthcare industry, rich with 
sensitive data, has seen a 100% increase in criminal attacks (not only phishing) between 
2010 and 2014 [27]. However, since the beginning of 2014, with the increase of hacking 
and malware attacks, security professionals believe that phishing will be a major concern 
for healthcare in 2015 [26].  
 Phishing attacks often use one of the bigger financial institutions as the seemingly 
trustworthy entity to initiate an attack. A 2015 McAfee study shows that PayPal, 
Amazon, eBay, Bank of America, and HSBC are the most used “hooks” in phishing 
attacks [24]. In addition, phishing susceptibility varies across departments within an 
organization. McAfee survey of 60,000 business users found that employees in 
accounting, finance, and HR departments are more likely to fall for phishing attacks than 
employees in other departments [24]. This becomes a real issue for organizations given 
that these departments deal with most of the sensitive employee, client and financial data 
[24].  
 But why is phishing so popular among attackers? In their work, Parrish, Bailey, 
and Courtney note that phishing is popular because it provides a high return on 
investment (ROI) for attackers [14]. The cost of sending phishing emails continues to 
decrease - currently, an attacker can send tens of thousands of emails for less than $200, 
while a response rate as low as 1% can yield a 1000% return or higher [14]. Even though 
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viruses and spyware cause more overall damages than phishing, “the average amount of 
damage to the victim exceeds those damages eight times over (Singh, 2007)” [14]. In 
situations in which customer’s credit card information is stolen, financial institutions 
often need to cover the cost associated with the damage [14]. “This makes phishing not 
only an individual problem, but an organizational problem as well with a ripple effect of 
higher costs to consumers as the institutions attempt to cover expenses caused by losses” 
[14].         
2.2.2 People and Phishing 
Why are people vulnerable to phishing? Sheng, Holbrook, Kumaraguru, Cranor, and 
Downs specify the four reasons that make people vulnerable to phishing [21]:  
1) Focusing too much on the “look and feel” of the website to determine its 
legitimacy; 
2) Not paying attention to the security indicators in the web browser; 
3) Lack of knowledge or experience in identifying a phishing attack, even though 
awareness might exist; and  
4) Perceived consequences of phishing attacks are not a good indicator of user’s 
behavior. 
Besides the four common reasons that make people vulnerable to phishing attacks, 
studies show that susceptibility to phishing attacks varies mainly with people’s age and 
gender but those can be mediated using control variables such as education level, Internet 
activity, technological savviness, job roles and exposure to phishing training [21]. For 
example, Sheng et al. found that individuals 18-25 were most vulnerable to phishing 
attacks because younger people have less education and experience in navigating these 
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kinds of risks [21]. Similarly, Parrish et al. found that college students were “alarmingly 
susceptible to email phishing attacks” even though they are computer literate [14]. They 
also found that younger people are more susceptible to phishing due to having less prior 
negative experience (prior scams) compared to older people [14]. Darwish, Zarka, and 
Aloul explained that due to higher level of agreeableness, younger people are more likely 
to fall for phishing attacks, specifically, 62.3% from age 18-25 compared to 41.1% of 26 
and older [28].  
 As previous research found, since younger people, merely due to their age, have 
less number of years of education, less number of years on the Internet and less exposure 
to security training [21], these three factors, combined with additional company-specific 
and perceived skills-based factors, will be used in this paper to determine the effect of 
age on phishing susceptibility, knowledge of security terms and concepts and knowledge 
of security policies. The effect of age will be examined both separately and in 
combination with other demographic, company-specific and skills-based factors.  
 When examining the relationship between gender and phishing susceptibility, 
Sheng et al. found that women are significantly more susceptible to phishing attacks than 
men due to their lower technical knowledge [21]. Technical knowledge, in this paper, can 
be defined as a combined effect of educational background and the current job role 
(technical vs. non-technical role). In regards to educational background, previous 
research found that while science and technology department students were invulnerable 
to phishing attacks compared to business, education and liberal arts students, all of them 
fell for spear phishing attacks (interestingly, highest percentage was among science 
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students) [28]. Sheng et al. further found that differences in income or education level did 
not affect gender differences on phishing susceptibility [21].  
 Darwish, Zarka, and Aloul explained that users who spend their time on the 
Internet doing online shopping and online banking are more likely to get phished than 
users who use Internet just to check their emails and do simple browsing [28]. They 
further explained that women’s higher susceptibility to phishing attacks could be a result 
of their more agreeable personality and the fact that women do more online shopping 
than men (“… in 2010 women generated 58% of e-commerce dollars globally”) [28].  
 This suggests that current technical knowledge (combined educational 
background and job role) and Internet activity can have an effect on the relationship 
between gender and phishing susceptibility. Additionally, since anti-phishing training is 
found to decrease overall phishing susceptibility by 40% [21], these three factors, 
combined with additional company-specific and skills-based factors, will be used in this 
paper to determine the effect of gender on phishing susceptibility, knowledge of security 
terms and concepts and knowledge of security policies. The effect of gender will be 
examined both separately and in combination with other demographic, company-specific 
and skills-based factors. 
2.3 Passwords 
Even though they are not the most secure way to protect organizational assets, 
passwords are still the most common form of user authentication [33]. To access 
organizational assets, it is imperative to establish and confirm user’s identity [33]. 
Password authentication is a three step process: 1) the user enters a username (a 
commonly agreed upon code between the user and the company); 2) the user enters the 
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password (a code only known to him/her); and 3) the system verifies that the 
username/password pair matches with what is on file [33].  
 Zviran and Haga differentiate between the system-assigned passwords that are 
provided to users by administrators and user-selected passwords that are chosen by end-
users [33]. System-assigned passwords, even though generally stronger than user-selected 
ones, are hard to remember for end-users and not as widely used in practice [33]. On the 
other hand, user-selected passwords are weaker but easily remembered by end-users [33]. 
Due to their simplicity, ease of administering and user-friendliness, user-selected 
passwords are the most popular mean of authentication [33]. All the below discussions 
about passwords are related to user-selected passwords. 
 On users’ knowledge about password security, the literature highlights two 
different findings. On one side, Riley found that even though users know what it takes to 
create secure passwords, they do not apply those criteria in practice [34]. Likewise, users 
were able to identify the most common password recommendations, but the majority 
failed to identify the most secure combination of using numbers and special characters 
instead of letters [34]. On the other side, a CSID3 study identified a disconnect between 
users’ action and intention [35]. Despite the careless password practices (e.g., password 
reusability, sharing), 89% of users “feel secure with their current password management 
and use habits” [35]. This further strengthens the belief that even though weak passwords 
may cause data breaches, poor password habits are the result of user negligence rather 
than their malicious intent [36]. Company employees are unaware of security risks that 
come with creating weak passwords or using one password across multiple sites [36]. A 
                                                          
3 CSID is “the leading provider of global enterprise level identity protection and fraud detection solutions 
and technologies.” See www.csid.com 
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2014 Ponemon study found that 31% of data breaches in US have been caused by 
negligent employees or contractors [32].  
 So how do attackers exploit employee passwords? It is important to understand 
the attack methods that hackers use to be able to educate users on how to defend 
themselves (and the company) against the same. Besides phishing attacks during which 
employees give out their login credentials through phone or website, attackers can also 
use various password cracking methods to find user passwords [37]. The most common 
methods include guessing, dictionary attacks and brute-force attacks [37, 38].  
 Guessing works on creating lists of passwords that are most commonly used by 
users, including the list of “most commonly used passwords” by general public [39] and 
passwords created by meaningful items to the user such as name, family members’ 
names, pet names, etc. [38]. Attackers check social networks and user online activity to 
learn about him/her and make an “educated guess” [37]. Similarly, dictionary attacks list 
the possible words that users can have as a password and often include few special 
characters at the beginning or at the end of the word to check for [38]. Important thing to 
note with dictionary attacks is that the password must exactly match the word in the list 
aka “dictionary” for the attack to succeed [38]. Brute-force attacks systematically check 
all the possible combinations for the password [38] by going through “all possible alpha-
numeric combinations from aaa1 to zzz10” [37].  Due to their systematic check, they are 
pretty inefficient with long passwords so the best defense against them is password length 
[38].  
 To defend against the password cracking attacks, various password characteristics 
are considered, including length, composition, lifetime, and selection [33]. When it 
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comes to password length, even though technical specifications vary across operating 
systems, the recent versions of Windows (Windows Vista/7/ Windows Server 2008) 
allow passwords up to 127 characters4 [40]. However, what is of more concern for 
organizations is minimum character length requirements [55], as brute force-style attacks 
are very efficient against shorter passwords [38]. Most organizations create security 
policies to enforce a minimum character length, generally 8 characters (although this 
varies by each company policy) [54, 55] and many require employees to change 
passwords regularly [56]. Shay et al. [41] found that NIST’s (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology) assumptions about users creating passwords with minimum 
character length did not hold true, as the average password length for their users 
(students, faculty and staff of Carnegie Melon University) was 10 characters, which was 
2 characters above the minimum length. Similarly, a CSID study found that American 
consumers choose passwords that are between 8 and 10 characters in length, with the 
average length 9.57 characters [35]. Additionally, Kelley et al. [42] found that password 
length is one of the most crucial aspects to consider in creating a strong password (16-
character passwords without special characters were harder to guess than the 8-character 
password with mixed case and special characters); they suggest NIST should consider 
giving more value to password length.  
Several factors play into password security, including composition, lifetime, and 
selection. First, the larger the character set (including uppercase and lowercase letters as 
well as special characters and symbols) from which the password is chosen, the harder it 
is to guess it [43]. That said, the majority of users (80%) in a 1999 study reported having 
                                                          
4 Passwords this long are not practical for everyday use, but this threshold suggests we don’t have to worry 
about the password’s upper character limit in most modern operating systems. 
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alphabet-only-passwords [33]. Second, frequency of changing passwords may impact 
vulnerability. Zviran and Haga [33] found that 80% of Department of Defense (DoD) 
computer system users never changed their work passwords (mainframe computer system 
or its local area network). A more recent CSID study on American consumers found that 
8% of users never change their passwords, 12% change it once a year, while 44% change 
it less than once a year [35]. It seems that users do not change passwords unless they are 
required to do so, hence to ensure that passwords are changed in a timely manner, 
organizations often reduce a given password’s lifetime to 30, 60 or 90 days [56]. Finally, 
an individual’s password selection method refers to how users choose their passwords 
(e.g., based on user’s name, family member, or any meaningful detail or mix of 
meaningful details) [33]. Zviran and Haga [33] found that using passwords with 
meaningful details “limits the number of guesses a penetrator needs to make” and hence 
makes the password easier to guess. They further found that 78% of users had passwords 
based on meaningful details [33].  
 When choosing a password, there has to be a balance between its memorability 
and security [33]. If passwords are too complicated (depending on password selection 
method and composition), are not used very frequently or are frequently changed, they 
are more likely to be forgotten and hence written down [33]. Zviran and Haga found that 
if users write passwords down, they store them in insecure locations, which then changes 
the game of “guessing” to a game of “locating” for attackers [33]. Some of the most 
common places to store passwords include sticky notes posted on desks, keyboard or 
monitors, as well as on public white boards or notebooks, calendars and/or organizers left 
out on desks [33, 45]. The DoD’s Password Management Guidelines strongly encourage 
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employees to take steps to protect written passwords so that they are “consistent with the 
damage that could be caused by their compromise” [33]. Research suggests that a large 
percentage of employees write down passwords at least occasionally [33, 41]. 
 Demographic findings on password forgetting habits show that in the university 
setting with a new policy change, faculty and staff were three times more likely to forget 
their passwords than students while women were two times more likely to forget their 
passwords than men [41]. Shay et al. also found that age or IT experience did not show 
difference in password forgetting habits associated with the introduction of new policy 
[41]. However, CSID study found that 76% of individuals of age 18-24 are concerned 
with remembering passwords so they choose passwords to be secure but also easy to 
remember [35] which could explain why students forget passwords less than faculty.  
Password sharing and reuse are big concerns for organizations nowadays [46]. A 
SailPoint survey found that 20% of employees share passwords with team members [46]. 
While people in IT related jobs and backgrounds are less likely to share their passwords 
with someone else, individuals age 22 and younger are most likely to share their 
passwords [41]. Office admins, managers, first level supervisors, and sales staff are also 
more likely to share their passwords than those in other job types [44].  
Password reuse is a big risk for organizations [36]. A CSID study found that 61% 
of American consumers reuse their passwords across multiple sites [35] while a SailPoint 
survey found that 56% of company employees reuse passwords between corporate and 
personal apps [46]. “When a consumer reuses a password and login combination across 
multiple sites and one site is hacked, it opens the other sites to risk as well” [35]. This 
means that if employees use the same password for personal and work accounts, if their 
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personal account gets hacked (as it is generally less secure), the attackers will have an 
entry into the organization as well [36].5 Hence, it is recommended that after major data 
breaches, company employees are notified about the breach and required to change their 
passwords [36].   
Women and young individuals are more likely to reuse passwords across multiple 
sites [41, 35]. Women are significantly more likely to reuse passwords (considering slight 
modifications) than men (69% vs. 55%) [41]. Individuals in the age group 18-24 are more 
likely to reuse passwords than individuals from any other age group, with 76% of them 
admitting to reusing passwords across multiple sites [35].  
As password length and composition are the most important factors in creating 
strong passwords [45], to determine overall password strength, password entropy or 
“guessability” are usually measured [42]. Entropy, or “the expected value (in bits) of the 
information contained in a string” [42] measures the password strength based on the 
password characteristics, including password length, character placement, number of 
each character type in the password, and the content of each character” [41]. Entropy can 
be used to measure the difficulty of guessing an individual password [41]. The study on 
guessability, i.e., “the time needed for an efficient password-cracking algorithm to 
discover a password,” found that length is the most important factor when considering the 
password strength as a 16-character password without special characters and mixed case 
alphanumeric took longer to guess than the 8-character password with special characters 
and mixed case alphanumeric characters [42]. This suggests that “entropy might be useful 
                                                          
5 This process, known as “daisy chaining,” was described in detail by Wired’s Mat Honan in 2012 after 
security flaws in Apple and Amazon’s security policies, as well as his own poor password management, led 




when considering an adversary who can make a large number of guesses, but not when 
considering a smaller number of guesses” [42].  
In summary, the literature reviewed found a number of demographic and 
company-specific factors associated with employees’ password habits. Employees in 
industry sectors such as financial institutions, military and telecommunications generally 
have better password management practices and longer job tenure positively affects the 
support for organizational security behaviors [44]. People in IT related fields (or IT 
background and education) have a lower tendency to share their passwords [41] while 
office admins, managers, first-line supervisors and sales staff are more likely to do so 
[44] as are individuals of age 22 and younger [41]. Individuals in the age group 18-24 are 
less likely to forget their passwords (they create passwords to remember them easily) [41] 
and are more likely to reuse the same password across multiple sites [35]. Women are 
more likely to forget passwords and reuse them across multiple sites compared to men 
[41].  
 Even though younger adults and women generally have less secure password 
habits, these factors combined with additional company-specific and skills-based factors, 
will be used in this paper to determine the effect of age and gender on password 
susceptibility, knowledge of security terms and concepts and knowledge of security 
policies. The effects of age and gender will be examined both separately and in 
combination with other demographic, company-specific and skills-based factors. 
2.4 Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) 
Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) or Choose Your Own IT (CYOIT) refers to the 
growing practice of using personal devices (smartphones, tablets and PCs) to connect to 
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the organizational network [7]. A PricewaterhouseCoopers study found that one third of 
small businesses and 75% of large businesses allow employees to connect to the 
organizational network with a personal device [47]. When it comes to the number of 
employees, 56% connected to the organizational network with a personal device in 2014, 
a 19% increase from 2013 [50]. BYOD has been identified as one of the increasing 
security concerns organizations will face in 2015 and beyond [4, 5, 7, 8]. Research by the 
Ponemon Institute found that while 9% of respondents in 2010 identified mobile devices 
as a risk to the IT environment, 73% expressed the same concern by the end of 2013 [48]. 
Additionally, 87% of IT managers believe that mobile devices, in the hands of negligent 
employees, presented the biggest security threat in 2014 [50].   
Research by Gartner suggests that BOYD will become the “rule rather than the 
exception” in the near future [51]. Studies show that BYOD acceptance is a win-win 
situation for both employers and employees [49]. “BYOD strategies are the most radical 
change to the economics and the culture of client computing in business in decades. The 
benefits of BYOD include creating new mobile workforce opportunities, increasing 
employee satisfaction, and reducing or avoiding costs” [51]. Companies benefit in being 
able to achieve their goals without investing too much into software or hardware [49]. It 
also saves them money from buying corporate mobile devices or even desktops and 
laptops [49]. Employees also see a big benefit in BYOD. It increases employees’ morale 
and job satisfaction as employees love the comfort of using their own devices [49]. 
Additionally, BYOD gives employees the flexibility to stay connected and get their work 
done anytime from anywhere which increases productivity [49]. BYOD also increases 
innovation, especially in the mobile app development area [51].  
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 As seen in Figure 3 below, today’s BYOD landscape consists of a multitude of 
connected devices. The most commonly used devices are Apple iPhones and iPads, 
Samsung Galaxy smartphones and Microsoft Windows tablets [51]. Security becomes 
increasingly difficult as the number and diversity of devices are incorporated into 
organizational network; for example, in 2012 more than 100 vulnerabilities have been 
found in iOS and Android devices [53]. This number is expected to increase as 
organizations allow more devices to connect to the corporate network, which in turn will 
attract more hackers to explore and find new vulnerabilities [53].  
 
Figure 3: BYOD Landscape. Source: McAfee [51] 
 Despite its popularity, BYOD poses significant IT challenges when it comes to 
the complexity of securing the perimeter as well as the users [51]. With the introduction 
of BYOD, controlling the endpoints has become extremely hard (sometimes impossible) 
as the endpoint security became dependent on the users who own the device [7]. 
Moreover, users connecting to the corporate network with various different devices and 
different operating systems create challenges for IT administrators who need to 
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understand the security vulnerabilities for all the different devices [51]. Additionally, the 
myriad of apps that exist for each of the different operating systems (over one million for 
Apple Store and over 1.5 million for Google Play) makes it difficult to inspect, control 
and manage the apps that users install on their devices [51]. With users’ tendency to share 
and store corporate data on the web (sending internal email to webmail), use cloud-based 
platforms (e.g., iCloud, Dropbox), and use their mobile devices over unprotected Wi-Fi 
networks, they are putting corporate data at risk [51].  
Employees are often so focused on their productivity and getting their work done that 
they are unaware of the security risks that they pose to their organization [51]. Some of 
the most common mistakes that users make are [47, 51]: 
1) They often do not implement screen-locking mechanisms on their devices 
(password, pin, pattern, biometrics, etc.). Studies show that users, especially 
under a lot of pressure to get the work done, find it annoying, or even intolerable, 
to constantly lock and unlock their devices.  Hence, 40% of users do not have a 
password on their device.  
2) They often do not apply updates to the mobile and laptop applications, even 
though it is widely known that mobile apps are not always very secure in their 
initial releases. 
3) They keep both corporate and personal data on their devices and do not separate 
between the two. Without BYOD policies that will clearly delineate the two and 
make the corporate data secure (e.g. encryption), data loss or leakage with 
significant consequences is possible.  
24 
 
4) They may, unknowingly, store untrusted content on their devices (e.g. unsecure 
apps or phishing links in text messages). 
5) They may share confidential information on social networking sites such as 
Facebook or Twitter.  
6) They often use “free” unsecured Wi-Fi in cafes, airports and other public places 
which can open doors for hackers.  
In addition to these common mistakes, security leaders cite data loss due to stolen or 
lost devices as their top concerns especially with devices that store unencrypted data and 
have no remote-wipe ability [52].  
In this paper, company-supplied laptops will also be considered in a separate section 
as they pose significant security risks due to their dependence on end-users for the 
ultimate endpoint security. This is especially noticeable when it comes to employees’ 
password and locking habits, corporate and personal data storage, desires for availability 
of particular software, connecting through unsecured Wi-Fi and leaving devices 
unattended [63].  
Even though the literature reviewed did not evaluate how demographic, company-
specific, or skills-based factors influence the knowledge of and adherence to companies’ 
policies around BYOD and company-issued devices, this thesis will evaluate if any such 





3. Proposed Research Model and Hypotheses 
In order to better understand how various factors influence employees’ knowledge 
of security policies and ability to protect themselves from organizational security threats, 
this thesis evaluates organizational security using quantitative data collected from a 
survey distributed to employees of a mid-sized U.S. consulting firm and qualitative data 
from interviews with security experts. The primary focus of the data collections will be to 
understand the relationship between “human” factors (e.g., demographics, company-
specific, skills-based) and an individual employee’s security risk to the organization. 
More broadly, these data will be used to make recommendations for developing more 
inclusive strategies organizations can employ to increase knowledge of and compliance 
with organizational security policies.  
Figure 4 below depicts the model being tested in this thesis. Independent variables 
(located in the leftmost column of the model) are grouped into three broad categories: 
demographic, company-specific and skills-based factors to determine how they, when 
examined both separately and combined, affect (if at all) the three dependent variables 
listed in the middle column: (1) likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (2) 
knowledge of security related terms and concepts and (3) knowledge of current security 
policies.  
 Once analyzed, the findings from this model—combined with findings from 
interviews with security experts—will be used to create strategies that companies can 





Figure 4: Proposed Model to be Tested 
 
Hypotheses for the specified paths are as follows: 
H1: Employees’ demographic characteristics will significantly correlate with their (a) 
likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) knowledge of security terms and 
concepts, and (c) knowledge of current security policies.  
H1a: Female employees, in comparison to male employees, will have (a) a greater 
likelihood of falling victim to a security threat (b) less knowledge of security 
terms and concepts, and (c) more knowledge of current security policies. 
H1b: Age will be (a) negatively correlated with likelihood of falling victim to a 
security threat, (b) positively correlated with the knowledge of security terms and 
concepts, and (c) positively correlated with the knowledge of current security 
policies.  
H1c: Education will be (a) negatively correlated with likelihood of falling victim 
to a security threat, (b) positively correlated with the knowledge of security terms 
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and concepts, and (c) positively correlated with the knowledge of current security 
policies.  
H2: Employees’ company-specific factors will significantly correlate with their (a) 
likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) knowledge of security terms and 
concepts, and (c) knowledge of current security policies. 
H2a: Employees who have received security training on the job will have (a) a 
lower likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) more knowledge of 
security terms and concepts, and (c) more knowledge of current security policies, 
compared to employees who have not received security training. 
H2b: Employees’ length of time with the company will be (a) negatively 
correlated with likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) positively 
correlated with their knowledge of security terms and concepts, and (c) positively 
correlated with their knowledge of current security policies.  
H2c: Employees in more tech-oriented departments (job roles) will have (a) a 
lower likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) more knowledge of 
security terms and concepts, and (c) more knowledge of current security policies, 
compared to employees in less tech-oriented departments (job roles). 
H2d: Employees in corporate sector6 will have (a) a higher likelihood of falling 
victim to a security threat, (b) less knowledge of security terms and concepts, and 
(c) more knowledge of current security policies, compared to employees in all 
other sectors.  
                                                          
6 That is, employees in corporate office management roles who don’t visit client sites. 
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H3: Employees’ perceived skills and knowledge will significantly correlate with their (a) 
likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) knowledge of security terms and 
concepts, and (c) knowledge of current security policies. 
H3a: Employees’ perceived Internet skills will be (a) negatively correlated with 
likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) positively correlated with their 
actual knowledge of security terms and concepts, and (c) positively correlated 
with their actual knowledge of current security policies.  
H3b: Employees with a technical background will have (a) lower likelihood of 
falling victim to a security threat, (b) greater actual knowledge of security terms 
and concepts, and (c) greater actual knowledge of current security policies 
compared to employees without technical background, when compared to 
employees without a technical background. 
H3c: Employees’ length of time in technical role will be (a) negatively correlated 
with likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) positively correlated with 
their actual knowledge of security terms and concepts, and (c) positively 
correlated with their actual knowledge of current security policies.  
H3d: Employees’ perceived technical knowledge will be (a) negatively correlated 
with likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) positively correlated with 
their actual knowledge of security terms and concepts, and (c) positively 
correlated with their actual knowledge of current security policies. 
H3e: Employees’ perceived security awareness will be (a) negatively correlated 
with likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) positively correlated with 
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their actual knowledge of security terms and concepts, and (c) positively 
correlated with their actual knowledge of current security policies. 
H3f: Employees’ perceived knowledge of company security policies will be (a) 
negatively correlated with likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (b) 
positively correlated with their actual knowledge of security terms and concepts, 












To address the research questions, the following data collection activities have been 
performed: 
1) An invitation to participate in an online survey on employees’ awareness on 
company’s security policy and current security behaviors was distributed to 2000 
employees from a mid-sized US IT consulting company.7  
2) Interviews with the company’s Security Officer, VP of Operations and two 
security team members (total of 4 interviews) were conducted in May 2015 to 
acquire information about the company’s security policy, incidents caused by 
human behavior, and challenges in creating/enhancing user awareness programs. 
3) Interviews were conducted with 15 security specialists from the private, 
educational, and government sectors to discuss security awareness best practices 
and initiatives they undertook when dealing with “Securing the Human” in 
organizational settings. 
See Appendix A for the full survey instrument8 and Appendix B for the interview 
protocol.  
4.1 Data Collection Procedures 
4.1.1 Surveys: Interested parties were directed to an online survey, hosted on 
SurveyGizmo, where they were presented with the consent form. If they agreed to 
participate, they were taken to the survey, which asked them general questions about 
current security policies and their thoughts about improving security awareness 
organization wide. Skip logic was used for follow-up questions; for example, people who 
                                                          
7 The company being studied has requested its name be omitted from any write-ups of this study. 
8 Some of the knowledge questions were adapted from literature reviewed, namely [33] and [64].  
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received security training received additional questions compared to people who had not 
received training. The survey concluded with demographics. The full survey took 10-15 
minutes to complete. By the end of the survey period of 9 days, a total of 266 responses 
were collected.  
4.1.2 Interviews: Interview participants were contacted via email using known 
contacts in the security field. Interviews took place over the phone or through Skype. 
Interviews lasted, on average, 40 minutes (range: 22-76 minutes) and covered the most 
salient security topics organizations face. Participants were asked if they wished to use a 
pseudonym or if their real name could be used. The total of 19 interviews were conducted 
(including the company security team) and 18 were audio recorded. The interviews are 
currently being transcribed; therefore, in this paper, only high-level themes from the 
interviews will be presented as part of recommendations section. A future publication 
will include detailed results from the interviews.  
4.2 Dependent Variables 
There are three primary dependent variables included in this study: (1) 
employees’ likelihood of falling victim to a security threat, (2) employees’ knowledge of 
security related terms and concepts, and (3) employees’ knowledge of company’s current 
security policies. The outcomes of these three measures are then used to create strategies 
that companies can implement to create/enhance user awareness programs and create a 
security-oriented culture. All three dependent variables took into account the four 
components of the company’s security policy: phishing, passwords, BYOD, and 




4.2.1 Likelihood of Falling Victim to a Security Threat 
This set of variables measures employees’ current security practices to determine 
what percentage of employees represents a significant security threat to an organization. 
Security practices measured include employees’ ability to recognize malicious emails, 
understand employees’ password habits and smartphone and laptop usage. Sample 
questions (which were multiple choice) include: “Have you ever clicked on a link in the 
email from your employer-supplied laptop or client PC that took you to a malicious 
site?”; “When creating a password in a work environment, what is your top priority?”; 
and “How often do you apply updates to your employer-supplied laptop, for applications 
which are NOT updated automatically by the employer?” 
Variable recoding and averaging was used to create composite measures for each of 
the four threats. The below steps were performed: 
1) To measure the likelihood of being a phishing victim, two items (clicking on 
phishing link and opening suspicious attachments) were combined into a single 
variable due to the low number of employees (i.e., 15) who either clicked on the 
link or opened a malicious attachment. 
2) To measure the likelihood of being a password victim, a risk ranking system has 
been created for each password-related question to score individual answers based 
on the risk value from lowest (1) to highest risk (5) (see Table 1 below).  
Table 1. Details on creating likelihood of being a password victim variable.1 
 
Risk Value  
Metric 1 2 3 4 5 





































Not chosen by 





















Easy to enter   
Usage No     Yes   
Sharing No     Yes   
1 The risk value for each selected answer was determined based on security best practices, literature 
reviewed and in consultation with Raymond Gabler, founder and CEO of RGS Specialists. 
 
 For all the radio-button questions, values were recoded from the entered 
value to a risk value as given in Table 1 above. For all the checkbox questions 
(where multiple answers could be selected), the values were first recoded to a risk 
value, then summed up and averaged based on the number of choices an 
employee selected.  
 Once all the recalculated variables were created for different password 
parameters (length, storing, priority, etc.), the combined password victim variable 
was calculated as an average value of all seven password parameters. To 
minimize the number of missing values, the MEAN function of SPSS was used to 
calculate the average value as long as six of the seven password parameters were 
entered. For any case that had less than six password parameters, the average was 
not calculated; it was coded as missing and was dropped from analysis.  
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3) To measure the likelihood of being a BYOD victim, a risk ranking system has 
been created for each BYOD-related question to score individual answers based 
on the risk value from lowest (1) to highest risk (5) (see Table 2 below). 
Table 2. Details for creating likelihood of being a BYOD victim variable.1 
 
Risk Value  
Metric 1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 
Email 
Frequency 





Once a day 



























































Updates As soon as 
available 










Yes     No   
1 The risk value for each selected answer was determined based on security best practices, 
literature reviewed and in consultation with Raymond Gabler, founder and CEO of RGS 
Specialists. 
 
 For all the radio button questions, values were recoded from the entered 
value to a risk value as given in Table 2 above. For all the checkbox questions 
(where multiple answers could be selected), the values were first recoded to a risk 
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value, then summed up and averaged based on the number of choices an 
employee selected.  
 Once all the recalculated variables were created for different BYOD 
parameters (email frequency, lock, lock number of characters, etc.), the combined 
BYOD victim variable was calculated as an average value of all eight BYOD 
parameters. To minimize the number of missing values, the MEAN function of 
SPSS was used to calculate the average value as long as six of the eight BYOD 
parameters were entered. For any case that had less than six BYOD parameters, 
the average was not calculated; it was coded as missing and was dropped from 
analysis. 
4) To measure the likelihood of being a laptop victim, a risk ranking system has 
been created for each laptop-related question to score individual answers based on 
the risk value from lowest (1) to highest risk (5) (see Table 3 below).  
Table 3. Details for creating likelihood of being a laptop victim variable.1 
Risk Value  
Laptop 1: 2: 3: 4: 5: 










Update Frequency  
As soon as 








1 The risk value for each selected answer was determined based on security best practices, 
literature reviewed and in consultation with Raymond Gabler, founder and CEO of RGS 
Specialists. 
 
 Since both of the laptop questions were radio-button questions, values 
were recoded from an entered value to a risk value as given in Table 3 above. 
Then the average value of the two variables was calculated to get the laptop 
victim variable. For every case, the average was calculated as long as both of the 
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laptop variables had valid values; otherwise, it was coded as missing and was 
dropped from analysis. 
4.2.2 Knowledge of Security Terms and Concepts 
The knowledge of security terms and concepts variable measures employees’ 
comprehension of various security terms. For each survey item, a correct answer was 
given two points and an incorrect answer was given zero points (see Table 4 below). 
Table 4. Computing knowledge of security variable. 




Not Correct Correct  
What is the goal 
of encrypted data 
transmission?  
The data is protected against 
viruses | The data is not corrupted 
during transmission | Only the 
user herself can see the data 
The data can’t be eavesdropped 
What is malware? 
Software which is not working 
properly  
Software which is automatically 
updating itself  
A faulty technical device 
Software which is unwanted and 
might be harmful 
What is phishing? 
The analysis of user’s browsing 
behavior | The sending of 
unwanted ads | The uninstalling 
of software that needs too much 
resources 
A form of deception using email 
or messaging in which an 
attacker attempts to fraudulently 
acquire sensitive information 
from a victim by impersonating a 
trustworthy entity 
What is social 
engineering? 
Distribution of software-testing 
tasks to several engineers in order 
to find security leaks | The 
development of software for 
social networks |  
The development of charitable 
apps which are free of charge 
Psychological manipulation of 
people into performing actions or 
divulging confidential 
information 
How can you 
recognize 
malicious emails? 
None of the above 
By email sender | By email 
subject |  








None of the above 
Checking the URL | Using 
toolbar tools like McAfee Site 
advisor or similar | Checking 
website safety ratings and 
reputation | Checking the site’s 
digital certificate 
What makes the 
password strong?  
None of the above 
Length 
Randomness 
Avoidance of dictionary words 
The use of alphanumeric and 
special characters 





None of the above 
Always keep software and OS 
up-to-date | Avoid downloading 
unknown software (apps) from 
the Internet | Use antivirus to 
scan your device often | Avoid 
visiting unfamiliar or unknown 
websites | Avoid using unsecured 
wireless networks 
   
 For all the radio-button questions, values were recoded from the entered value to a 
point value as given in Table 4 above. For all the checkbox questions (where multiple 
answers could be selected), the values were first recoded to a point value, then summed 
up and averaged based on the number of choices an employee selected.  
 Once all the recalculated variables were created for individual knowledge 
questions, the combined security knowledge variable was calculated as an average value 
of the eight knowledge questions. To minimize the number of missing values, the MEAN 
function of SPSS was used to calculate the average value as long as six of the eight 
knowledge questions were answered. For any record that had less than six knowledge 
questions answered, the average was not calculated; it was coded as missing and was 
dropped from analysis.   
 Additionally, after the security knowledge questions were asked, another question 
was raised to ask employees how confident they were in their answers to these 
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knowledge questions. Their confidence levels were then tested against their knowledge 
score.   
4.2.3 Knowledge of Current Security Policies 
This variable measures employees’ knowledge of the company’s security policy, 
specifically, as it relates to general security policy (have employees read it, have they 
understood it) and password requirements based on the policy. For each security policy 
related question, the correct answer was given two points, partially correct answer one 
point, and incorrect answer zero points (see Table 5 below). 
Table 5. Computing knowledge of general of organizational security policies.  
Knowledge of current security 
policies 
Knowledge Value 0-21 




Does your employer have a 
security newsletter? 
No   Yes 
How often does the company 
security newsletter come out? 
About once a 
quarter | 
About once a year | 
I am not sure 
About once a 
week 
About once a 
month 
Does your company have a 
security policy? 
No   Yes 
How long has it been since your 
employer last updated its 
security policy? 
About a year | 
I am not sure 
About one month 
| 
About six months 
About three 
months 
Have you read the most current 
security policy? 
No, but I plan to 
read it | No, and I 





Did you understand the security 
policy? 
No, I need help to 
understand it 




Yes, it is all 
straight forward 




What is the current password 
expiration timeframe based on 
your employer’s password 
policy? 
30- | 60- | 120 days | 
There is no 
expiration 
  90 days 
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What is the maximum number of 
password retries before your 
employer account gets locked? 
10 | 20 | Unlimited   31 | 5 
What is the current minimum 
password length for your 
organization? 
There is no 
minimum |  
5- | 10- | 15-
characters 
  8 characters 
When you change your 
password on your employer-
supplied laptop, what is the 
minimum number of characters 
you need to change? 
0 | 4 | 6 | 8 |  
I am not sure 
  1 
1 The maximum number of password retries for the surveyed company is 4, hence both 3 and 5 were 
accepted as correct answers. 
 
Since all the policy-related questions had radio button response options, values 
were recoded from the entered value to a point value as given in Table 5 above. Then, all 
the general security policy questions (excluding passwords) were summed and averaged. 
To minimize the number of missing values, the MEAN function in SPSS was used to 
calculate the average value as long as four of the six general policy questions were 
answered. For any case that had less than four questions answered, the average was not 
calculated; it was coded as missing and was dropped from analysis. 
 Similarly, all the password policy related questions were summed up and 
averaged using the MEAN function in SPSS. The average value was calculated as long as 
three of the four password policy questions were answered. For any case that had less 
than three questions answered, the average was not calculated; it was coded as missing 
and was dropped from analysis. 
 Finally, the general security policy and password security policy variables were 
summed up and averaged to get the final variable that measures the knowledge of 
company’s security policies. To minimize the number of missing values, the MEAN 
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function of SPSS was used to calculate the average value as long as one of the two final 
policy values (general or password) were calculated.  
4.3 Independent Variables 
All of the independent variables had to be recoded or slightly modified to be 
suitable for analysis.  
4.3.1 Demographic Factors 
Demographic factors, considered in analysis, include sex, age and education. For 
ANOVAs and t-tests, the age and education variables were converted into simple 
categorical variables. Sex (M=0.30, SD=0.46) was left unchanged. For regression 
analyses, the full (ratio or ordinal) variables were used.  
Age (M=37.94, SD=11.18) was divided into four groups and was calculated using 
quartiles. Groups are as follows:  
 Group 1: 18-28 years  
 Group 2: 29-36 years of age 
 Group 3: 37-47 years of age 
 Group 4: 48+ years of age 
Education (M=4.25, SD=0.59) was collapsed into three categories: 
 Group1: Employees without Bachelor’s degree 
 Group2: Employees with Bachelor’s degree 




4.3.2 Company-Specific Factors 
Company-specific factors, considered in analysis, include security training, 
employment time with the company, job role (department), and the industry sector. 
When it comes to security training (M=0.36, SD=0.48), only 35.6% of company 
employees received security training in 2015 (this number includes training received at 
the client sites as well). Of those, 66.3% received training in social engineering, 58.4% in 
password requirements, 33.7% in BYOD policies and 69.7% in proper company-supplied 
laptop usage.9  
 When analysis was performed for a particular security threat, two factors were 
considered: whether an employee received training or not, and the training topic (e.g., 
phishing topic for phishing security threat). For the knowledge of security terms and 
concepts and knowledge of policies DVs, the only factor considered was whether an 
employee received security training or not. No changes (variable recoding) were 
performed for either of the factors.  
 Employment time (M=3.91, SD=4.40) was calculated using data from the number 
of years and months the participant reported being employed by the company. 
Additionally, ranges of employment time were calculated based on quartiles: 
 Group 1: Less than one year 
 Group 2: 1-2.5 years 
 Group 3: 2.51 -4.99 years 
 Group 4: 5+ years 
 
                                                          




Job role initially started as department variable but due to too many variations, three 
broad categories were created and used in all analyses.  
 Group 1: Employees in office management (including sales, HR, Admin work, 
etc.) 
 Group 2: Employees working as Project Managers and Business Analysts 
 Group 3: Employees working in IT (including programming, testing, product 
support, system analysis, etc.) 
Industry sector variable has also been condensed due to too many variations. It was 
eventually divided into six categories based on the number of employees in each sector. 
This variable was used in all analyses.  
 Group 1: Financial sector 
 Group 2: Healthcare 
 Group 3: Utilities 
 Group 4: Retail 
 Group 5: Corporate (within the company) 
 Group 6: Other (includes transportation, manufacturing, government, legal, etc.) 
4.3.3 Perceived Skills and Knowledge Factors 
Employees’ perceived skills and knowledge factors include: perceived Internet 
knowledge, technical skills, and perceived knowledge of security awareness and policies. 
Perceived Internet knowledge (M=6.3, SD=1.07) variable was created as an average 
of two variables (perceived knowledge of (a) web skills and (b) Internet-specific 
concepts, with 1 being the lowest and 5 being the highest value). Since Internet-specific 
knowledge measures harder concepts (e.g., phishing, cookies) than the web skills variable 
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(e.g., online shopping), the value was multiplied by two (weighted higher) before the 
variables were averaged. This way the estimated average of two variables was a better 
representation of an employee’s perceived Internet knowledge. For ANOVAs, ordinal 
variables were created based on the quartiles as given below. For regressions, continuous 
variables were used. 
 Group 1: 0 - 5.5 points 
 Group 2: 5.75 - 6.5 points 
 Group 3: 6.75 - 7.0 points 
 Group 4: >7 points 
Technical skills were analyzed through three different variables: technical 
background (yes or no), number of years in a technical role, and perceived technical 
knowledge. For technical background (M=0.85, SD=0.36), there were no additional 
modifications. 
Number of years in a technical role was divided into four groups based on quartiles: 
 Group 1: 0 - 5.0 years 
 Group 2: 5.01 -13.00 years 
 Group 3: 13.01 - 20 years 
 Group 4: 20.01+ years 
Perceived technical knowledge (M=3.97, SD=0.87) was divided into three groups 
based on quartiles: 
 Group 1: 1 - 3  
 Group 2: 3.50 - 4  
 Group 3: 4.50 - 5  
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Perceived awareness of security concepts and policies are two different variables. 
Those were mainly analyzed separately (although an aggregated variable was also 
created). 
Perceived security awareness (M=4.11, SD=0.78) was divided into four groups based 
on quartiles: 
 Group 1: 0 - 3.50 
 Group 2: 3.51 - 4.00  
 Group 3: 4.01 - 4.50  
 Group 4: 4.51+  
Perceived security policy knowledge (M=3.7, SD=0.95) was also divided into four 
categories based on the quartiles: 
 Group 1: 0 - 3 
 Group 2: 3.1 - 4  
 Group 3: 4.1 - 4.5 
 Group 4: >4.5   
The combined variable, perceived security policy and awareness knowledge 
(M=3.91, SD=0.76), was calculated as the average value of the two variables above. The 
combined variable was divided into four groups based on the quartiles: 
 Group 1: 1-3.25 
 Group 2: 3.50-4  
 Group 3: 4.25 -4.50  




4.4 Data Analysis 
Before running analyses, a correlation matrix was evaluated with all the variables 
in the model (see Appendix C). The correlations were examined for potential multi-
collinearity issues; if any variables appeared too similar, the weaker variable was dropped 
from analyses. This was the case with age and number of years in a technical role 
variables. Due to high collinearity (r=0.789, p<.001), number of years in a technical role 
variable was dropped from multivariate analyses.  
Although the initial model posits relationships between the three dependent 
variables, there were no significant correlations between any of these factors, so no 
additional analyses were conducted.  
Next, each of the independent variables from the three groups (demographic, 
company-specific and skills-based) were tested against the three dependent variables. T-
tests and ANOVAs looked for differences between various groups for a specific 
dependent variable.  
Finally, stepwise multiple regressions were run for each of the dependent 
variables. Each step contained a group of independent variables based on the proposed 
model (demographic variables, company-specific variables, and general skills and 
knowledge variables) to determine what the unique contribution is of each group of 






Findings presented below are based on survey responses from 250 company employees 
(16 cases were deleted due to missing data). The study sample (which truthfully 
represents the company population10) includes employees from diverse age and 
employment duration groups but less diverse with other factors. The majority of 
employees are males, well-educated (Bachelor’s and higher) with a technical background, 
facts to be considered when interpreting the study results. Sample demographic data is 
included in Table 6 below. 
Table 6. Demographic Data (N=250). 





18-28 years 28.70% 
29-36 years 22.60% 
37-47 years 26.50% 










Bachelor's Degree 70% 






Employment Time 3.91 4.4 
0-0.999 years 26.80% 
1-2.50 years 26% 
2.51 -4.99 years 20.80% 
5+ years 26.40% 
 
ANOVAs were run for every independent variable to examine variance for a 
specific dependent variable. Findings below are organized by dependent variables.  
 
                                                          
10 This was confirmed with the organization’s HR manager.  
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5.1 Likelihood of Falling Victim to a Security Threat 
ANOVAs show that various demographic, company-specific, and skills-based variables 
significantly affect the likelihood of employees becoming victims of security threats due 
to phishing, passwords, BYOD and the use of company-supplied laptops. All of these 
security threats were tested both separately and combined across all the demographic, 
company-specific, and skills-based variables.  
5.1.1 Phishing Victims  
Very few company employees reported ever clicking on a phishing link and/or opening a 
malicious attachment. Specifically:  
1. 4% of employees (10 out of 250) said they have clicked on a link in email; 100% 
of those provided credentials on the site, and only one user reported a negative 
impact (i.e., a virus deleted all the .pst files and those backed up by the company). 
2. 2% of employees (5 out of 250) said they have opened a malicious attachment 
sent via email; 100% of those reported a negative impact (e.g., deletion of .pst 
files, impact using IE, corrupted desktop/laptop). 
The small number of “successful” phishing attacks could be due to the fact that the 
sample is male-dominated, well-educated, and technically savvy, which all affects 
phishing susceptibility [21]. Additionally, the small number of employees affected by 
phishing techniques created significantly imbalanced analysis categories. While none of 
the independent variables significantly affected the likelihood of an employee becoming 
a phishing victim (see Tables 7 and 8 below), this finding should be further evaluated 




Table 7. ANOVA findings for the likelihood of being a phishing victim. 
Variable 
Categories 
Independent Variables Mean Comparison 
Demographic 
variables 
Sex t(232)=-0.006, ns 
Age F(3,223)=2.07, ns 
Education F(2,240)=0.42, ns 
Company-specific  
variables 
Security training (Yes/No) t(234)=1.365, ns 
Phishing training t(56)=-1.427, ns 
Employment time F(3,243)=0.651, ns 
Job role F(2,238)=0.838, ns 
Industry sector F(5, 221)=0.64, ns 
Skill-based  
variables 
Internet skills F(3,241)=0.547, ns 
Tech background t(44)=0.852, ns 
Time in tech role F(3,197)=1.524, ns 
Perceived tech knowledge F(2,238)=0.762, ns 
Perceived security awareness  F(3,242)=1.66, ns 




Table 8. Regression findings for the likelihood of being a phishing victim.  
Independent 
Variables 
Model 1:  
Demographic 
Factors 
Model 2:  
Company Factors  
Model 3:  
Skills-based 
Factors 
  ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value 
Sex .021 .774 .021 .787 .021 .803 
Age .120 .101 .117 .133 .105 .195 
Education -.003 .968 .005 .950 .015 .846 
Security training     -.095 .195 -.100 .187 
Employment time     .012 .873 .009 .913 
Job role     .003 .966 .014 .870 
Industry sector     -.014 .845 -.013 .858 
Internet skills         -.089 .391 
Tech background         -.020 .829 
Perceived tech 
knowledge 
        .080 .482 
Perceived security 
awareness 
        -.046 .625 
Perceived security 
policy knowledge 
        .060 .487 
F test F(3,199)=.91, ns F(7,199)=.65, ns F(12,199)=.50, ns 
Adjusted R2 -.001 -.013 -.031 
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5.1.2 Password Victims 
Demographic, company-specific, and skills-based variables were evaluated to determine 
which variables cause the highest likelihood for employees to be password victims. One-
way ANOVA looked at differences between various groups for each independent 
variable. ANOVA findings are listed in Table 9 below (significant findings are bolded).  
Table 9. ANOVA findings for the likelihood of being a password victim. 
Variable Categories Independent Variables Mean Comparison 
Demographic  
variables 
Sex t(237)=-4.1, p<.001  
Age F(3,228)=5.86, p<.001 
Education F(2,245)=0.736, ns 
Company-specific 
 variables 
Security training (Yes/No) t(247)=2.089, p<.05 
Password training t(87)=0.20, ns 
Employment time F(3,248)=0.219, ns 
Job role F(2,243)=7.2, p<.001 
Industry sector F(5,225)=2.359, p<.05 
Skill-based  
variables 
Internet skills F(3,246)=12.7, p<.001 
Tech background t(244)=3.504, p<.001 
Time in tech role F(3,202)=6.408, p<.001 
Perceived tech knowledge F(2,243)=24.1, p<.001 
Perceived security awareness F(3,247)=7.12, p<.001 
Perceived security policy 
knowledge F(3,246)=4.42, p<.01 
 
 ANOVA findings show that from demographic variables, sex and age 
significantly affect the likelihood of being a password victim. Females are at higher risk 
of being password victims than males, specifically when it comes to password storing 
(p<.05), password choice (p<.01), password priority (p<.01), password sharing (p<.01), 
and the use of random password generators (p<.01). Findings show that even though a 
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large number of females store passwords in their memory (head), they are more likely to 
store passwords in less secure places such as sticky notes, text files on the computer, in 
the emails and password-protected documents. They are also more likely to choose 
passwords based on meaningful details that are easy to remember, share passwords with 
others and reuse corporate passwords for personal matters (not significant). However, 
males are more likely to use random password generators for creating passwords than 
females.  
Looking at age, young employees (ages 18-28) are at the highest risk of being 
password victims (significantly different from employees in age group 37-47, p<.001), 
specifically when it comes to password choice, password priority and password personal 
use. Employees ages 18-28 are most likely to choose passwords based on a combination 
of meaningful details (significantly different from age group 37-47 (p<0.001), and that 
are easy to remember and enter (significantly different from ages 26-36, p<.05). They are 
also most likely to reuse corporate passwords for personal matters (significantly different 
compared to employees in age groups 37-47 (p<.05) and 48+ (p<.01).  
Employees with security training have better password habits than employees 
without training; hence they are less likely to be password victims. This is mainly visible 
with password priority as employees without training are more likely to choose 
passwords that are easy to enter and remember (which are then also easier to break) 
compared to employees who received training who are more likely to choose passwords 




Employees who work in office management roles (HR, sales, finance, 
management, etc.) are at the highest risk of being password victims (significantly 
different from employees in IT roles, p<.001), specifically when it comes to password 
storing, password choice and password priority. Employees in office management roles 
are more likely to store passwords in riskier places (text files on the computer, email, 
hidden sticky notes, notebook, password protected doc) (significantly different from 
BA/PM (p<.01) and IT roles (p<.001)), choose passwords that are more predictable 
(significantly different from IT roles (p<.05)) and choose passwords that are easier to 
remember (significantly different from IT roles (p<.05)).  
Employees working in various industry sectors also have a different likelihood of 
being password victims. In line with the findings from job role variable, employees 
working in corporate offices (including various geographical regions) are most likely to 
store password at insecure places and hence being password victims. Password storing 
habits of employees in corporate offices significantly differ from employees working in 
financial (p=.01), healthcare (p<.001), utilities (p=.01), retail (p<.001) and other sectors 
(p<.001). These findings could be due to the low number of people from corporate 
offices (5.7%).  
Interestingly, employees working in financial sector are more likely to share 
passwords with others than people working in any other sector (this is significantly 
different compared to other sectors such as legal, government, transportation, 




Looking at skills-based factors, every independent variable examined is 
significantly associated with employees’ likelihood of becoming a password victim. The 
more perceived knowledge and experience an employee has in using the Internet, dealing 
with technology and around general security awareness (including company’s security 
policy), the less likelihood of an employee being a password victim.  
Once all the individual factors were tested in ANOVA, an OLS regressions was 
run to observe the full model. Standardized betas for each model can be found in Table 
10 below (significant findings are bolded). 








Model 3:  
Skill based factors 
 
ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value 
Sex .248 .000 .202 .004 .121 .097 
Age -.122 .080 -.145 .043 -.099 .160 
Education .020 .774 .010 .881 .018 .780 
Security training 
  
-.093 .167 -.056 .398 
Employment time 
  
.005 .943 .021 .753 
Job role 
  
-.231 .001 -.145 .051 
Industry sector 
  
-.087 .202 -.066 .310 
Internet skills 
    
-.135 .138 
Tech background 
    
.034 .666 
Perceived tech 
knowledge     
-.191 .058 
Perceived security 
awareness     
-.037 .658 
Perceived security 





F(7,203)=5.11, p<.001 F(12,203)=5.30, 
p<.001 




In step one of the regression model (demographic variables), sex is the only 
significant predictor for an employee being a password victim. In step two, which adds 
company-specific variables, sex, age, and job role are significant predictors; however, job 
role (ß=-.23) has a stronger effect than sex or age. In step three, adding the skills-based 
variables mitigates the effects of other variables and no significant variables emerge as 
significant. However, job role and perceived technical knowledge show marginal 
significance in predicting an employee being a password victim. This suggests that one’s 
job role (i.e., day-to-day work activities) and perceived technical knowledge (which goes 
hand in hand with job role) are most likely to determine employee’s likelihood of being a 
password victim.  
The adjusted R2 value has been increasing with each step which further implies 
that besides making conclusions based on employee’s demographic characteristics, 
company-specific and skills-based characteristics need to be checked as well to get the 
better estimate of employee’s likelihood of being a password victim. However, since the 
adjusted R2 predicts only 20.3% of the variable, future studies should examine additional 
factors that could predict employees’ likelihood of being password victims.  
5.1.3 BYOD Victims 
Demographic, company-specific and skills-based factors were evaluated to determine 
which factors cause the highest likelihood for employees to be BYOD victims. First, one-
way ANOVA was run to see the difference between various groups for each independent 
variable. ANOVA findings are listed in Table 11 below (significant findings are bolded). 
Table 11. ANOVA findings for the likelihood of being a BYOD victim. 
Variable Categories Independent Variables Mean Comparison 




Age F(3,184)=2.84, p<.05 
Education F(2,196)=1.965, ns 
Company-specific  
variables 
Security training (Yes/No) t(175)=1.539, ns 
BYOD training t(70)=0.729, ns 
Employment time F(3,198)=1.063, ns 
Job role F(2,193)=1.213, ns 
Industry sector F(5,176)=1.83, ns 
Skill-based  
variables 
Internet skills F(3,197)=1.98, ns 
Tech background t(195)=1.734, ns 
Time in tech role F(3,160)=0.821, ns 
Perceived tech knowledge F(2,194)=3.293, p<.05 
Perceived security awareness F(3,198)=1.586, ns 




ANOVA findings show that from demographic and skills-based variables, age 
and perceived technical knowledge significantly affect the likelihood of being a BYOD 
victim. Employees in age group 18-28 are at highest risk of being BYOD victims as they 
are least likely to use antivirus software on their smartphones compared to other age 
groups (p<.05; no significant difference between particular groups).  
Employees with higher perceived technical knowledge are less likely to be BYOD 
victims compared to employees with lower perceived technical knowledge (significant 
difference between the lowest and highest knowledge groups, p<.05). This difference 
likely stems from the frequency of smartphone app updates. The more perceived 
technical knowledge employees have, the more frequently they update their apps 
(significant difference found between lowest and medium (p<.01) and lowest and highest 
knowledge groups (p<.001)). 
Even though specific BYOD training didn’t yield significant results, employees 
who received any security training are at less risk when it comes to phone locking than 
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employees without training (p<.05). This is best portrayed with the fact that 19.7% of 
employees without training don’t lock their smartphones compared to 6.9% of employees 
who received training (X2=9.6, ns). But the fact that security training is not significant for 
the aggregated BYOD victim variable is concerning. This could be due to the quality and 
relevance of the topic, and mode of training received which should be evaluated further 
in future studies.  
Interestingly, employees in IT roles are at highest risk when it comes to phone 
locking compared to both BA/PM roles (p<.05) and office management roles (p<.05). 
This is due to the fact that 60% of IT employees use pins or sliding patterns to lock their 
smartphones, while employees in office management and BA/PM roles (~50% of both 
groups) use passwords and/or biometrics. This difference could stem from different OS 
usage (employees in IT roles use Androids and iPhone equally while BA/PM and office 
management roles mainly use iPhones) as well. 
Employees in office management roles check their work emails on the phone 
significantly more than employees in IT roles (p<.05) and update their apps less 
frequently than employees in BA/PM roles (p<.05) and IT roles (p<.05).  
Employees who have higher Internet skills (p<.01), technical background 
(p<.001) and perceived security awareness (p<.01) generally update apps more 
frequency than employees with less knowledge in these areas. Additionally, employees 
with higher Internet skills generally use longer passwords to lock their smartphones 
compared to employees with fewer reported skills (p<.05).   
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Once all the individual factors were tested in ANOVA, the full model was tested 
via OLS regression to determine the major predictors for becoming a BYOD victim. 
Regression findings can be found in Table 12 below (significant findings are bolded).  








Model 3:  
Skill based factors 
 
ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value 
Sex .049 .544 .016 .846 -.066 .468 
Age .055 .493 .002 .985 .043 .623 
Education -.181 .024 -.162 .046 -.164 .045 
Security training 
  
-.073 .360 -.051 .541 
Employment time 
  
.118 .164 .142 .099 
Job role 
  
-.107 .182 -.018 .847 
Industry sector 
  
-.029 .724 -.017 .831 
Internet skills 
    
.085 .449 
Tech background 
    
-.035 .733 
Perceived tech 
knowledge     
-.254 .045 
Perceived security 
awareness     
-.021 .831 
Perceived security 
policy knowledge     
-.042 .644 
F test F(3,161)=1.99, ns F(7,161)=1.71, ns F(12,161)=1.51, ns 
Adjusted R2 .018 .03 .037 
 
In step one of the regression model, education is the only significant predictor for 
an employee being a BYOD victim. Education remains significant with the addition of 
company-specific factors (step two) and skills-based factors (step three). In other words, 
the more education and more perceived technical knowledge an employee has, the less 
likely s/he will become a BYOD victim.  In addition, perceived technical knowledge is 
also significant, with higher perceived technical knowledge negatively associated with 
becoming a BYOD victim. It is important to note though that the adjusted R2 is quite low 
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(explaining just 4% of the variance in the full model), suggesting that additional factors 
are influencing the DV.   
5.1.4 Laptop Victims 
Demographic, company-specific and skills-based factors were evaluated to 
determine which factors cause the highest likelihood for employees to be laptop victims. 
One-way ANOVA was run to see the difference between various groups for each 
independent variable. ANOVA findings are listed in Table 13 below (significant findings 
are bolded). 
Table 13. ANOVA findings for the likelihood of being a laptop victim. 
Variable 
Categories 
Independent Variables Mean Comparison 
Demographic  
variables 
Sex t(237)=-2.465, p<.05 
Age F(3,228)=1.74, ns 
Education F(2,245)=1.059, ns 
Company-specific  
variables 
Security training (Yes/No) t(247)=-0.53, ns 
Laptop training t(87)=2.58, p<.05 
Employment time F(3,248)=0.505, ns 
Job role F(2,243)=2.97, ns 
Industry sector F(5,225)=1.280, ns 
Skill-based  
variables 
Internet skills F(3,246)=3.214, p<.05 
Tech background t(195)=1.734, ns 
Time in tech role F(3, 202)=0.971, ns 








From demographic variables, ANOVA findings show that only sex has a 
significant effect for employees’ likelihood of being laptop victims. Females are at higher 
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risk of being laptop victims than males (p<.05) as they apply updates to their employer 
laptops less frequently (p<.001); that is 15.5% of females never apply updates compared 
to 10.1% of males. Also, 31% of females only run updates when forced to compared to 
15.4% for males. 
Even though there is no significance for the aggregate laptop variable, employees 
in age group 18-28 run updates significantly less than employees in age group 29-37 
(p<.05); that is, 41% of employees in age group 18-28 never run updates or only run 
them when they are forced to compared to 23% of employees in age group 29-37.  
From company-specific factors, security training on laptop-related topics is the 
only variable that shows significant difference. That significance mainly stems from a 
fact that employees with laptop training use their company laptops more frequently than 
employees without training (p<.05)11. 56% employees with training use their company 
laptops at least every work day compared to 30% of employees without training.  
Employees with laptop training also update their apps on the laptop more 
frequently (as they use their laptops more) however that is not statistically significant 
(p=0.123). Additionally, employees in office management job roles use their laptops 
more frequently than employees in IT (p<.001) or BA/PM roles (p<.001) and hence are 
at less risk of being laptop victims.  
Multiple skills-based variables affect the likelihood of being a laptop victim such 
as Internet skills, perceived technical knowledge, perceived security awareness and 
policy knowledge. The common theme for all of them is that the higher the perceived 
knowledge the less likelihood of employees being laptop victims, specifically related to 
                                                          
11 Employees who use laptops more frequently get more frequent updates (considering automated updates) 
which decreases security risk. 
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the frequency of running updates on the company laptop. Significant differences between 
higher knowledge and lower knowledge groups are as follows: Internet skills (p<.05), 
perceived technical knowledge (p<.01), perceived security awareness (p<.001) and 
perceived policy knowledge (p<.001).  
Once all the individual factors were tested in ANOVA, the whole model was 
tested via OLS regressions to see what the major predictors are for becoming a laptop 
victim when all variables are considered together. Regression findings can be found in 
Table 14 below (significant findings are bolded).  








Model 3:  









Sex .174 .015 .178 .015 .159 .035 
Age -.100 .158 -.056 .446 .019 .796 
Education .120 .090 .110 .122 .110 .106 
Security training     -.005 .944 .068 .318 
Employment time     -.121 .100 -.099 .164 
Job role     .120 .086 .164 .033 
Industry sector     -.101 .153 -.082 .225 
Internet skills         -.047 .617 
Tech background         -.018 .823 
Perceived tech 
knowledge 
        -.079 .446 
Perceived security 
awareness 
        -.001 .991 
Perceived security 
policy knowledge 








Adjusted R2 .036 .056 .146 
 
In step one of the regression model, which only looks at demographic variables, 
sex is the only significant predictor for an employee being a laptop victim, with female 
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employees being significantly more likely than male. Sex remains significant with the 
addition of company variables (step two) and skills variables (step three), while one’s 
position in the company and their perceived knowledge of company’s security policies 
also emerge as significant. Given that perceived security policy knowledge is the most 
significant predictor, perceived knowledge of security policies, which list the proper 
laptop usage, should be considered first in determining employees’ likelihood of being 
laptop victims.  
The adjusted R2 value has been increasing with each step, which further implies 
that besides making conclusions based on employee’s demographic characteristics, 
company-specific and skills-based characteristics need to be checked as well to get the 
better estimate of employee’s likelihood of being a laptop victim. However, since the 
adjusted R2 predicts only 14.6% of the variable, future studies should examine additional 
factors that could predict employees’ likelihood of being laptop victims. Those could 
include employee’s laptop locking habits, frequency of leaving laptops unattended, 
frequency of using (un) secured Wi-Fi from these devices, family members accessing 
these devices and whether they have experienced stolen/lost company devices.  
5.1.5 Security Victims 
Finally, all the security threats (phishing, passwords, BYOD and laptop usage) 
were combined to test the likelihood of being a security victim. Demographic, company-
specific and skills-based variables were evaluated to determine which factors cause the 
highest likelihood for employees to be security victims. One-way ANOVA was run to see 
the difference between various groups for each independent variable. ANOVA findings 
are listed in Table 15 below (significant findings are bolded). 
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Table 15. ANOVA findings for the likelihood of being a security victim. 
Variable Categories Independent Variables Mean Comparison 
Demographic  
variables 
Sex t(237)=-3.27, p<.001 
Age F(3,228)=4.5, p<.01 
Education F(2,245)=0.249, ns 
Company-specific  
variables 
Security training (Yes/No) t(247)=0.168, ns 
Employment time F(3,248)=0.238, ns 
Job role F(2,243)=2.05, ns 
Industry sector F(5,225)=0.870, ns 
Skill-based  
variables 
Internet skills F(3,246)=7.769, p<.001 
Tech background t(73)=2.5, p<.01 
Time in tech role F(3,202)=2.058, ns 








ANOVA findings show that sex and age from demographic factors significantly 
affect the likelihood of an employee being a security victim. Females are at significantly 
higher risk of being security victims than males (p<.001) as are employees in age group 
18-28 who are at significantly higher risk from employees in age groups 29-36 (p<.05) 
and 37-47 (p<.05).   
None of the company-specific variables significantly affect the likelihood of an 
employee being a security victim but all of the skills-based factors do. All of the factors 
show the same theme: the higher the perceived knowledge in Internet-based technologies 
(p<.001), technical background (p=.015) and skills (p<.001), perceived security 
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awareness (p<.001) and perceived policy knowledge (p<.001), the less likelihood of an 
employee being a security victim.  
Surprisingly, security training didn’t show any significant difference in 
determining employee’s likelihood of being a security victim. This could be due to the 
relevance and quality of the topic, and mode of training that should be further checked in 
future studies.  
Once all the individual factors were tested in ANOVA, the whole model was 
tested via regressions to examine the major predictors for becoming a security victim 
when all variables are considered together. Regression findings can be found in Table 16 
below (significant findings are bolded).  








Model 3:  
Skill based factors 
  ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value 
Sex .207 .004 .182 .013 .149 .043 
Age -.132 .060 -.140 .059 -.051 .470 
Education .108 .123 .097 .172 .099 .136 
Security training     .002 .972 .084 .209 
Employment time     -.011 .879 .017 .802 
Job role     -.103 .141 -.054 .474 
Industry sector     -.063 .374 -.037 .575 
Internet skills         -.075 .412 
Tech background         .032 .689 
Perceived tech 
knowledge 
        -.121 .232 
Perceived security 
awareness 
        -.037 .663 
Perceived security 
policy knowledge 
        -.324 .000 
F test F(3,203)=5.03, p<.01 F(7,203)=2.54, p<.05 
F(12,203)=4.81, 
p<.001 




In step one of the regression, sex is the only significant predictor for an employee 
being a security victim. Then, when the company-specific variables are added, the R2 
drops, with none of these new variables significantly predicting the DV. Finally, in step 
three of the regression model, sex remains significant while one’s perceived security 
policy knowledge emerges as a significant predictor of becoming a security threat victim. 
In light of this, perceived knowledge of security policies should be considered first in 
determining employees’ likelihood of being a security victim.  
The adjusted R2 increased the most (from .05 to .18) with the addition of the 
skills-based variables, suggesting that these factors are most important (among those 
evaluated) in determining an employee’s likelihood of becoming a victim of a security 
threat. However, since the adjusted R2 predicts only 18.4% of the variable, future studies 
should examine additional factors that could predict employees’ likelihood of being 
security victims. 
5.2 Knowledge of Security Terms and Concepts 
Knowledge of security terms and concepts variable measures the averaged 
employee knowledge of specific security terms and concepts as outlined in Table 4 
above. Demographic, company-specific and skills-based factors were evaluated to 
determine which factors affect the employees’ security knowledge the most. One-way 
ANOVA was run to see the difference between various groups for each independent 
variable. ANOVA findings are listed in Table 17 below (significant findings are bolded). 
Table 17. ANOVA findings for the knowledge of security terms and concepts.  
Variable Categories Independent Variables Mean Comparison 
Demographic  
Sex t(107)=2.865, p<.01 
64 
 
variables Age F(2, 229)=1.43, ns 
Education F(2,246)=0.612, ns 
Company-specific  
variables 
Security training (Yes/No) t(248)=-0.920, ns 
Employment time F(3,249)=0.94; ns 
Job role F(2,244)=5.49, p<.01 
Industry sector F(5,226)=0.83, ns 
Skill-based  
variables 
Internet skills F(3,247)=4.093, p<.01 
Tech background t(45)=-2.42, p<.05 
Time in tech role F(2,203)=1.74, ns 








ANOVA findings show that from demographic variables, sex is the only variable 
that shows significance in relation to the knowledge of security terms and concepts. 
Males on average have a significantly higher knowledge of security terms and concepts 
than females (p<.01). 
From the company-specific variables, job role is the only variable that shows 
significance in relation to the knowledge of security terms and concepts. People in office 
management roles have on average lower security knowledge than people in BA/PM 
(p<.05) and IT roles (p<.01). 
When looking at the skills-based variables, perceived Internet skills, technical 
background and perceived technical knowledge affect employees’ knowledge of security 
terms and concepts. For each of these variables, the higher the perceived knowledge in 
Internet-related technologies (p<.01), technical background (p<.05) and skills (p<.01), 
the higher the knowledge of security terms and concepts.  
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Surprisingly, security training was unrelated to employees’ knowledge of security 
terms and concepts. This could be due to the relevance and quality of the topic, and mode 
of training that should be further checked in future studies.  
After answering all the knowledge questions, employees were asked to rate their 
confidence level on their answers to the security knowledge questions. ANOVA was run 
to determine the effect of questions confidence on the averaged security knowledge. 
Findings show significant results (F (3,232) = 12.04, p<0.05, p<.001), that is, employees 
with higher confidence in their answers on average have higher knowledge of security 
terms and concepts. 
Once all the individual factors were tested in ANOVA, the whole model was 
tested via OLS regressions to see what the major predictors are for determining 
employees’ knowledge of security terms and concepts. Regression findings can be found 
in Table 18 below (significant findings are bolded).  








Model 3:  
Skill based factors 
  ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value 
Sex -.203 .005 -.173 .019 -.086 .272 
Age -.072 .306 -.055 .463 -.055 .467 
Education .060 .398 .068 .341 .058 .413 
Security training     .019 .782 .036 .611 
Employment time     -.008 .909 -.009 .901 
Job role     .157 .026 .066 .408 
Industry sector     .046 .514 .041 .558 
Internet skills         .072 .463 
Tech background         .027 .747 
Perceived tech 
knowledge 
        .187 .084 
Perceived security 
awareness 





        -.081 .322 





Adjusted R2 .034 .042 .065 
 
In step one of the regression, sex is the only significant predictor for determining 
the knowledge of security terms and concepts, with males scoring significantly higher in 
their responses to the security concepts questions. When the company factors were added 
in step two, sex remains significant while one’s job role is also significantly correlated 
with security knowledge. However, when accounting for background skills and perceived 
knowledge (step three), these factors fall out of the model and no variable emerges as 
significant.  
The adjusted R2 for the full model is quite low (predicting only 6.5% of the DV), 
which is not surprising as none of the variables emerged as a significant predictor of 
security knowledge and concepts. This is especially surprising for the skills variables; 
future research should try to unpack these relationships. 
5.3 Knowledge of Current Security Policies 
Knowledge of current security policies variable measures the averaged employee 
knowledge of general and password related company policies as outlined in Table 5 
above. Demographic, company-specific and skills-based variables were evaluated to 
determine which factors affect the employees’ knowledge of current security policies. 
One-way ANOVA was run to see the difference between various groups for each 





Table 19. ANOVA findings for the knowledge of current security policies. 
Variable 
Categories 
Independent Variables Mean Comparison 
Demographic  
variables 
Sex t(137)=-0.413, ns 
Age F(3,229)=2.746, p<.05 
Education F(2,246)=1.462, ns 
Company-specific  
variables 
Security training (Yes/No) t(194)=-1.529, ns 
Employment time F(3,249)=1.372, ns 
Job role F(2,244)=0.129, ns 
Industry sector F(5,226)=0.198, ns 
Skill-based  
variables 
Internet skills F(3,247)=0.481, ns 
Tech background t(245)=0.672, ns 
Time in tech role F(3,203)=4.492, p<.01 








ANOVA findings show that from demographic variables, age is the only variable 
with significant results. Employees from age group 18-28 have the lowest knowledge of 
company's security policies while employees of age 48+ have the highest knowledge (no 
significant differences found between particular groups). 
Even though none of the company-specific variables show significant results for 
determining the knowledge of the current company’s policies, some of the skills-based 
variable do; namely, the number of years in a technical role, perceived security awareness 
and perceived security policy knowledge.  
Findings shows that the longer the employees work in a technical role, the higher 
the knowledge of company’s security policies. Specifically, employees working in a 
technical role for less than five years have lower knowledge of company’s security 
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policies than employees working in a technical role for 20+ years (p<.01). This 
significance stems from differences between these two groups in company’s password-
related policies (p<.05).  
Surprisingly, the number of years employed at the company didn’t show 
significant results which could imply, considering the above findings, that instead of 
considering the employment duration at one company, the total employment time of an 
employee could be a better estimate of their security policies knowledge (this could stem 
from the fact that some companies enforce it more than the others).  
Perceived security awareness and perceived security policy knowledge also have 
a significant effect on one’s knowledge of company’s security policies. The higher the 
perceived awareness score, the higher the knowledge of company's security policies 
(p<.01), mainly when it comes to the knowledge of general security policies (excluding 
password policy) (p<.001). This is the same for the perceived security policy knowledge 
as well. Employees who have higher perceived security policy knowledge have a higher 
knowledge of general security policies (excluding password policy) (p<.001). 
Even though security training doesn’t show significance for the combined policy 
variable, significance is shown when it comes to general security policy. Employees who 
received security training have a higher knowledge of company's general security policies 
than employees without training (p<.05).  
Once all the individual factors were tested in ANOVA, the whole model was 
tested via OLS regressions to see what the major predictors are for determining 
employees’ knowledge of current security policies. Regression findings can be found in 
Table 20 below (significant findings are bolded).  
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Model 3:  
Skill based factors 
  ß p-value ß p-value ß p-value 
Sex .061 .391 .068 .350 .038 .621 
Age .227 .001 .207 .006 .145 .050 
Education .031 .659 .032 .656 .040 .558 
Security training     .110 .116 .034 .620 
Employment time     .069 .354 .041 .569 
Job role     .004 .949 .038 .621 
Industry sector     .069 .329 .049 .477 
Internet skills         -.003 .974 
Tech background         -.079 .334 
Perceived tech 
knowledge 
        -.044 .676 
Perceived security 
awareness 
        .143 .101 
Perceived security 
policy knowledge 
        .234 .004 
F test F(3,204)=3.69, p<.05 F(7,204)=2.11, p<.05 
F(12,204)=3.14, 
p<0.001 
Adjusted R2 .038 .037 .112 
 
In step one of the regression model, which only looks at demographic variables, 
age is the only significant predictor for determining the knowledge of company’s security 
policies. Then, step two of the regression model, which looks at all of the demographic 
and company-specific variables together, shows that age is still a significant predictor 
(more important than company-specific variables). Finally, step three of the regression 
model, which looks at all of the demographic, company-specific and skills-based 
variables together, shows that age and perceived security policy knowledge are the 
significant predictors. This implies that the older an employee gets (which means more 
work experience too) the higher the perceived security policy knowledge, and then it turn 
the higher the knowledge of companies security policies.   
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In contrast to the analyses looking at knowledge of security concepts, the skills 
factors significantly increased the R2 in this model, suggesting they are positively 





The following sections provide a deeper discussion of organizational security and 
are grouped by the dependent variables.  
6.1 Phishing 
Previous research has found that phishing susceptibility varies mainly with 
people’s age and gender but that those can be mediated using control variables such as 
education level, Internet activity, tech savviness, job roles and exposure to phishing 
training [21]. For example, Sheng et al. found that individuals ages 18-25 were most 
vulnerable to phishing attacks because younger people have less number of years of 
education, less number of years on the Internet and less exposure to security training [21].  
In addition, research has found that women are significantly more susceptible to phishing 
attacks than men due to their lower technical knowledge [21], more agreeable personality 
and their Internet usage (mainly online shopping) [28]. Education level and income didn’t 
affect phishing susceptibility between men and women [21].  
Unlike previous findings, the current study didn’t find any significant differences 
for any of the demographic, company-specific or skills-based variables when each 
variable was tested separately (ANOVA) and when all the variables were combined 
(regressions). These findings could be due to the uneven study sample characteristics 
when it comes to gender, education, and technical background. The sample is male-
dominated (70%), well-educated (97% with Bachelor’s degree or higher), with the 
majority of employees having a technical background (85% total; 92.9% of males and 




Furthermore, as there were no differences between employees who have recently 
received security training and those who haven’t (neither when it comes to any security 
training nor phishing training specifically), it appears that other factors are at play in 
predicting phishing vulnerability that were not captured in this study. Those could 
include more details around the training such as the relevance and quality of training, 
mode of training and employee comprehension as, for example, previous findings [21] 
show, that simulated phishing attacks decrease phishing susceptibility by 40%. 
6.2 Passwords 
Previous literature looked at various password characteristics, such as length, 
composition, lifetime, selection and storage [33] as well as people’s password sharing 
[41, 44] and re-using habits [35, 41], all mainly through demographic and company-
specific factors. This study extends the literature reviewed by a) adding additional 
password characteristics such as password priority and the use of random password 
generators for creating passwords, b) creating a combined averaged variable of all the 
password characteristics c) adding skills-based variables to test password habits against 
and d) performing a more-in-depth analysis of each of the demographic and company-
specific variables as they relate to specific password characteristics and e) performing 
analysis with all variables (demographic, company-specific and skills-based) combined 
against the averaged password variable. 
 Similar to the CSID study on password length [35], this study found that the 
majority of employees (76%) create passwords between 8 and 10 characters in length 
while 24% of employees create passwords over 11 characters. Since the company’s 
minimum password length is 8 characters, and the survey item listed was a password 
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between 8-10 characters, it is unclear exactly how many employees only stick to 
minimum password requirements and how many go beyond that. Future studies should 
investigate this finding further.  
 Compared to previous research finding that 56% of employees reuse passwords 
across their corporate and personal accounts [46], this study found that only 20% of 
employees engage in this practice. More specifically, females (not significant), 
employees ages 18-28, and employees with lower perceived Internet knowledge and 
security awareness are most likely to reuse work passwords for personal use. Also in line 
with earlier research [41], findings indicate that younger employees mainly choose 
passwords that are easy to remember. However, in contrast to research suggesting that 
females tend to forget their passwords [41], female employees in this study also use 
passwords that are easy to remember, which reduces one’s likelihood of forgetting a 
password (even if this is a riskier behavior than choosing more complex passwords). 
When it comes to employees’ password sharing habits, previous studies have 
found that 20% of employees share passwords with others [46], while this was quite rare 
in the current study with only 2% of employees are doing that. Unlike previous findings 
that specify people in office management roles and of age 22 and under to be the most 
likely group to share passwords with others [41. 44], current findings (significant only) 
show that females and employees without a Bachelor’s degree are most likely to share 
passwords. Interestingly, compared to previous findings that employees in financial 
sectors have good password management habits [44], current findings show that 
employees working in financial sector are more likely to share passwords with others 
than employees working in other sectors. As this group of employees is likely to be 
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working with sensitive company and customer data, this is especially concerning from a 
management perspective. 
Even though the current study didn’t find significant differences for password 
sharing habits among various job roles (as was case in previous studies [41, 44]), when 
controlling for demographic and company-specific variables, employees’ job role is 
associated with their password habits. Employees working in office management roles 
have worse password habits than employees working in IT roles. 
Surprisingly, unlike previous studies [44], the employment time didn’t effect 
employees’ password habits. When controlling for demographic, company-specific and 
skills-based variables, employees’ job role and perceived technical knowledge are 
associated with their password habits. This further implies that no matter the number of 
years employed at the company, the technical skills and day-to-day work employees do 
affect their password habits the most.  
6.3 BYOD and Company-Issued Laptops 
Previous studies have found that the number of employees connected to 
organizational networks is on the rise, up 19% from 2013 to 2014 [50]. In line with these 
findings, current study found that 80% of company employees use their smartphones to 
check work emails. Also, with the increased user-base, the number of different devices 
connecting to corporate networks is on the increase too [53]. The most commonly used 
devices are Apple iPhones and iPads, Samsung Galaxy smartphones and Microsoft 
Windows tablets [51]. The current study only considered smartphones. Company 
employees mainly use iPhones (48.5%) and Android devices (42.4%), while Windows 
phone use is rare (7.2%). Even though previous findings show that Blackberries and 
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iPhones are more secure than Androids (and Windows phones are even less secure), these 
articles all argue that in a BYOD environment, any device  exposes the company to same 
risks without user education [57, 58].  
Previous research highlights that employees have poor security hygiene when 
using company devices such as work laptops and smartphones that have network access. 
For example, one study found that 40% of employees did not password protect their 
devices or apply updates to the mobile and laptop applications, even though it is widely 
known that mobile apps are not always very secure in their initial releases [47, 51]. The 
present study found that 15% of employees do not lock their smartphones and the lock 
question was not asked for laptops as all company-supplied laptops require passwords.  
Interestingly, the current study found that 47% of employees report updating apps 
on both their smartphones and company-supplied laptops as soon as they see the updates 
available. This finding, together with a smaller percentage of employees without phone 
PINs or passwords, could result from a) a very technical workforce (85% of employees) 
and b) peer pressure in work settings. Findings from this study show that employees who 
have higher Internet skills, technical background and perceived security awareness 
generally update apps more frequency than employees with less knowledge in these 
areas. Additionally, Herath and Rao [59] found that one’s immediate environment in the 
workplace affects employees’ security behaviors; for example, if an employee sees her 
coworkers adopting security policies, she will be more likely to also adopt them.  
This study extends previous research by a) looking at various BYOD and laptop 
characteristics and averaging them each into a separate variable (as described in Section 
4.2.1 of the methods) and b) looking at various demographic, company-specific and 
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skills-based variables to determine how those separately and combined affect each of the 
BYOD and laptop characteristics as well as the final averaged variables.  
Younger and less tech-savvy employees in this sample were the most likely 
BYOD victims. Additionally, employees in office management roles check their work 
emails on the phone significantly more frequently than employees in IT roles. On the 
contrary, employees in IT roles (60% of them) mainly use pins or sliding patterns to lock 
their smartphones (which are 4-digit) while employees in office management and BA/PM 
roles (~50% of both groups) use passwords and/or biometrics. This is interesting as 
employees in office management roles are less tech savvy than employees in IT roles.  
When it comes to being a laptop victim, female employees place themselves at a 
higher risk than males specifically when it comes to applying laptop updates; that is, 
15.5% of females never apply updates compared to 10.1% of males (X2=15.6, p<.05, 
p<.01). Also, 31% of females only run updates when forced to compared to 15.4% for 
males. Like women, younger employees also update significant less often than older 
employees: 41% of employees 18-28 never run updates or only run them when they are 
forced to compared to 23% of employees in age group 29-37 and 30% of employees of 
age 37+. Finally, when controlling for these and other factors, perceived knowledge of 
security policies emerges as the most significant predictor for becoming a laptop victim.  
 Furthermore, as there were no differences between employees who have recently 
received security training and those who have not (except for relation between laptop 
training and frequency of usage), it appears that other factors are at play in predicting 
BYOD/laptop vulnerability that were not captured in this study. Those could include 
more details around the training such as the amount of a topic covered, quality of the 
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training, mode of training and employee comprehension, as findings show that no matter 
the devices’ OS used, without user education, each and very device could put the 
company at the same risks [57, 58].  
6.4 Security Threats Combined 
To expand on previous studies, the current work looked at the four security threats 
both separately and combined to determine the likelihood of an employee becoming a 
security victim when all those factors are looked at together. This extends the current 
literature by giving a more detailed (analyzed across demographic, company-specific and 
skill-based variables) and holistic view of the most important factors companies should 
focus on when implementing training and other programs to reduce the likelihood of 
security breaches. 
So what are the most likely characteristics of a security victim based on the 
current findings? The security victim would most likely be a female, young (age 18-28), 
without a technical background, and with low perceived knowledge in Internet-related 
technologies, technical areas, company security policies, and general security awareness. 
The more of these characteristics a person has, the higher the likelihood they will become 
a security victim. However, while all of these variables have an effect on employees’ 
likelihood of being a security victim, some are more prominent than others. Specifically, 
the perceived knowledge of security policies is the most significant predictor, followed 
by sex and age.  
Interestingly, attending one or more security training sessions in the last year did 
not impact an employee’s likelihood of falling victim to security threats. There are a 
number of potential reasons for this finding including the training topic relevance and 
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quality, training mode, and employee comprehension. First, even though the survey asked 
employees about the topic and types of training attended, it was hard to determine how 
much of the topic-relevant information, and of what quality, were included as part of the 
training. As a result, some respondents may have reported attending sessions that were 
unrelated to these threats.  
Second, out of 89 employees who attended any security training, 66 reported it as 
mandatory online training, 36 as self-initiated online training and only 5 as in-classroom 
training.12 The high number of mandatory online training reports could be a result of 
employees’ tendency to include the reading of the security policy as part of the security 
training. This is interesting especially since the perceived knowledge of the security 
policies is the major predictor of an employee being a security victim.  
None of the employees mentioned receiving training that resembled real-life 
scenarios (e.g., simulated phishing attacks), which security experts and security studies 
have shown to be the most effective at decreasing security breaches [21]. Even though 
security experts, interviewed in the study, are divided on the best modes to deliver 
security training in the organizational environment, they all agree that training must be 
relevant, to the point, and employee-engaging. Also, for a training to be effective, it must 
clearly show a benefit to an employee.  
Third, as these training sessions do not include metrics to measure 
comprehension, it is impossible to evaluate how effective they were. Hence, security 
experts suggest that every training end with a quiz or questionnaire as well as to 
                                                          




frequently perform short incentive-based security tests to measure employees’ 
comprehension of previous training material on the on-going basis.  
To summarize, in order to better understand how security training effects 
employee’s likelihood of being a security victim, the training topic relevance and quality, 
training mode and employee comprehension should be considered in future studies.  
6.5 Knowledge of Security Terms and Concepts 
Unlike any literature reviewed, this study measured the average knowledge of a 
company employee as it relates to the four security threats to determine what variables 
(demographic, company-specific and skills-based) affect employees’ knowledge of 
security terms and concepts. This extends the current literature by measuring and 
combining the employee knowledge of all four security areas instead of just one.  
So based on the findings, which employees are likely to have the most knowledge 
about good security practices?  Based on the data, these employees are likely to be males 
with technical backgrounds and high levels of perceived knowledge about Internet and 
technical topics. These employees are most likely to be working in IT roles, where these 
skills are being put to use on a daily basis, as compared to many other roles where the 
only technical skill requirements are basic word processing and Internet knowledge. This 
further shows that employees’ sex and job role are the most significant variables to 
consider when determining employee’s knowledge of security terms and policies. 
Interestingly, security training didn’t show any significant effects on the security 
knowledge of employees. See section 6.4 for details about security training.  
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6.6 Knowledge of Current Security Policies  
Unlike any literature reviewed, this study measured the average knowledge of a 
company employee as it relates to the knowledge of current company security policies 
(including general security policies and password policies) through a quiz-style multiple 
choice question format that tested employees’ knowledge of various security policies.  
Findings show that younger employees have the least knowledge of company's 
security policies; age has a strong linear relationship to security policy knowledge with 
oldest employees (48+) exhibiting the most knowledge. In contrast to the analyses 
looking at security threat victims, security training was positively correlated with 
knowledge of company security policies (could be due to the fact that security policy was 
considered as a training); future studies should work to unpack the relationship between 
knowledge gained through training, and becoming a victim of a security breach.   
When demographic, company-specific and skills-based variables were considered 
together, perceived security policy knowledge was the only significant predictor (age 
only marginal) for employees’ knowledge of current security policies. One reason why 
employment duration did not show significant differences in employees’ knowledge of 
company security policies could be because of similarities in policies across companies 
(as explained by the significant positive correlation between employee age and perceived 





Based on the survey findings, reported by 250 company employees (>10% of total 
employees in organization) and interviews with security experts from educational, 
government, and private sectors, the following set of recommendations is presented 
below with the goal to help companies improve their security policies and practices, 
especially in regards to human-related security threats. 
Recommendations are grouped by security threat area: phishing, passwords, 
BYOD and laptop usage. After those, recommendations about security training and user 
awareness programs are listed as critical components for improving the security culture 
of an organization.   
Security experts universally agreed that the vast majority of security incidents that 
companies face are related to human factors, mainly the introduction of malware due to 
social engineering techniques (phishing, spear-phishing, etc.), employees’ download and 
browsing habits, and lost or stolen devices. When asked about minimum requirements 
companies must meet to operate securely, all experts agreed that first, companies must 
ensure that all the technical controls (firewalls, IDSs, network segregation, access 
controls, patch policies, etc.) are in place and working properly before “user controls” can 
be considered.  Let’s review security experts’ recommendations in these areas.   
7.1 Phishing 
Phishing is still one of the major problems companies face as it depends largely 
on human factors—a single employee who falls for a phishing campaign can compromise 
an entire company’s data security. Even though security experts urge companies to 
implement spam filters to block and filter out potentially suspicious emails, there are no 
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filters that can block every variation of malicious email. Furthermore, there are currently 
no filters available to block phishing phone calls (i.e., vishing), piggyback rides, 
tailgating and related strategies. Hence, educating employees on how to deal with 
unfiltered emails, phone calls, and people around them becomes a critical factor in 
securing the organizational network. This is because “there is no patch for user doing a 
wrong thing. There is no user firewall,” according to John Linkous, founder and CEO of 
InterPoint Group, LLC. Education becomes the only “user firewall” that protects the 
organization’s boundary when it comes to phishing (vishing, piggyback rides, tailgating) 
attacks.  
Security experts agree that the most effective way to fight against phishing attacks 
is through implementing real-life scenario-based trainings such as simulated phishing 
attacks. Previous research [21] supports this assertion, finding that simulated phishing 
attacks decreased phishing susceptibility by 40%. Additionally, annual trainings might be 
a good refresher, but such trainings should be based on recent stories, real data and real 
impacts so that employees can connect the more abstract concepts with real-world 
outcomes. Frequent reminders (e.g. one in few weeks) about phishing threats are crucial 
(through simulated attacks, emails, newsletters, posters, discussions, inceptive-based 
competitions, etc.) to keep employees aware that phishing threats are real and are daily 
causing business impacts.  
7.2 Passwords 
When it comes to mitigating threats related to user passwords, security experts 
agree that complex password policies must exist, that proper technical tools must be 
leveraged to enforce those policies, and that appropriate access controls (i.e., identity 
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management) must be well defined and enforced. Specifically, experts recommend the 
use of: 
1. two-factor authentication (use of tokens, smart cards, biometrics, etc.) as a 
requirement for external access (for internal access preferred)  
2. passphrases (multiple words together) that are 15+ characters in length 
3. password complexity (alphanumeric, uppercase and lowercase characters, 
symbols)  
4. a limited number of password attempts when accessing the network to protect 
against brute force attacks 
5. computer-generated passwords that are randomized and more secure (could be 
used for various server access) 
While security experts were proponents of password expirations based on 30-, 60- 
or 90-day intervals, John Linkous mentions that “changing a crappie password with 
another crappie password is not security.” This statement is in line with research that 
questions password expirations due to the predictability of a new password based on the 
old one [60].  
Interestingly, Raymond Gabler, founder and CEO of RGS Specialists, suggests 
that for all the web-based applications that list exact password requirements on the 
websites, passwords requirements should be specified as suggested instead of required to 
minimize the number of known password characteristic for an attacker.  
Finally, experts argue that there must be a balance between security and usability. 
If passwords are too complicated, employees are more likely to forget them and hence 
write them down. When it comes to password-storing mechanisms, the majority of 
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security experts recommend the use of password-manager tools (e.g., KeePass, 
1Password, Password Safe, Cyber Ark) as a good option compared to everything else; 
however, they come with disadvantages too (e.g., a single point of failure).   
Just like with phishing, once all the technical controls are in place, continuous 
education becomes a “user firewall” against password-related attacks, especially in 
circumstances when two-factor authentication is not implemented.  
7.3 BYOD 
When it comes to BYOD policies, security experts argue that companies have 
three choices to make: 
1) No personal devices and no company-issued devices allowed on the network 
2) Only company-issued devices allowed on the network 
3) Both personal and company-issued devices allowed on the network 
Obviously, not allowing any external devices or company-issued mobile devices 
to connect to the network is the most secure way to protect the organization; however, as 
previous research found, allowing employees to stay connected improves satisfaction and 
productivity [49, 61]. Capgemini consulting reports that employees who use their own 
devices for both work and personal matters put in 240 more hours a year than those who 
do not [61]. However, companies need to be careful when deciding on BYOD use as 
initial cost savings (from not providing a device) can be very costly if the BYOD 
solutions are not implemented properly [61].  
When companies want employees connected, security experts argue that going 
with a company-issued device is the easier and more secure option to choose. That is 
because there is a clear owner of the device data (i.e., the company), the device is on the 
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network (which means that is secured, audited and monitored as any other device), and if 
the device is lost or stolen, remote wipe is always possible. However, parts of the 
network that the device can access depend on company’s network segregation. Hence, 
before the devices are issued to employees, they should be verified for appropriate 
network segment access.  
In situations where companies allow employees to use their own devices, security 
experts note there are a lot more factors to consider. Even though companies might save 
money on the device itself, implementing MDM (Mobile Data Management) solutions is 
expensive and hard to set up. First, before allowing a device to connect to the network, 
the device should be scanned for viruses and malware and device password requirements 
enforced. Some level of monitoring, if possible, should be set up. Well-written device use 
policy must exist that clearly defines data ownership (what part of device data is used by 
the company and what by the user), user rights and responsibilities and agreement for 
remote wipe in case of a lost or stolen device (which could remove personal data 
depending on the MDM solution). However, parts of the network that the device can 
access depend on company’s network segregation. Hence, before employees are allowed 
to use their personal devices, the devices should be verified for appropriate network 
segment access.  
No matter which choice a company makes (company-supplied vs. personal 
devices), the less segregated the network is or the more company data the user has on the 
device, the greater the responsibility on the end-user. That is, employees need to ensure 
that password requirements are met, device OS and apps are updated regularly (for 
personal devices), and devices are not lost or stolen. But do employees or even 
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companies really think about all this? Yet again, continuous education becomes the “user 
firewall” in securing the companies’ end-points, especially when considering the 
intertwined nature between user’s passwords and apps update habits and personal devices 
used on corporate networks.  
7.4 Company-Supplied Laptops 
Companies often provide laptops to their employees to increase workplace 
flexibility, allowing employees to access the network and complete tasks when outside 
the office. On questions around company-supplied laptops, security experts argue that 
laptops should be locked down (i.e., employees should not have Admin rights), have 
encrypted drives, have proper monitoring in place (e.g., disabling access if user is 
inactive for an extended period of time), proper patch management practices and a well-
defined acceptable use policy. 
 The IT manager from the surveyed company said that malware infections 
significantly dropped since locking down company laptops. On the other hand, company 
employees reported a lot of productivity issues since the lock-down, which had the 
unintended consequence of some employees using their own personal laptops to get work 
done. Using personal laptops brings similar risks as using personal smartphones as 
mentioned in section 7.3 above. This shows how improving laptop security without 
allowing for employee convenience or ease of access can actually have opposite effects.  
Additionally, as part of acceptable use policy, employees should be aware that 
these laptops are for work purposes only, so allowing their children or family members to 
access them (i.e. to play games or access various websites) should be forbidden. Also, 
employees should be cautious not to leave their laptops unattended and should always 
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lock their laptops when stepping away from them (e.g., during a break). A security expert 
who works in higher education suggested randomly walking through work areas and 
checking on employees’ locking habits to increase compliance with this practice. 
Additionally, encrypted drives and two-factor authentication should be instituted 
for all the company-issued devices to minimize risks in case of unattended, lost or stolen 
laptops when the only obstacles for criminals is to crack the employee password [63]. 
Implementing encrypted-drives and two-factor authentication becomes extremely 
important as employees who deal with the most sensitive data (office management 
employees), based on this study, are most likely to be password victims.  
Finally, continuous education in this area would help employees tremendously in 
understanding the true reasons behind laptop lock-downs and various use policies (e.g., 
show the number of incidents and impacts prior to lock down and post lock-down 
initiatives). Only after users understand the true reasons behind the changes that are 
impactful for them (e.g. locked-down laptops), they would be able to serve as “user 
firewalls” in protecting companies’ endpoints.  
7.5 Training 
There is no doubt that employees should be trained in every security area, but what 
constitutes a good user awareness program? Security experts recommend the following 
components be included in any employee security training programs: 
1) Use of real-world scenarios - simulated phishing attacks, simulated password 
cracking attacks, etc.  
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2) Use of real world, real data, real people – include interesting current examples 
that show facts (other events in the news, or company events like monitoring 
reports and trends) 
3) Emphasize the intertwined nature of the four security threats (e.g. poor password 
habits can cause employees being BYOD or laptop victims) 
4) Make it personal and important – engage employees, show an example on one of 
their personal accounts (e.g. let’s hack your FB account or let’s see what people 
can find out about you based on your data online) and how can that affect them 
and their families 
5) Classroom setting preferred but engaging online training rated high as well 
6) Mandatory training enforced (people who don’t complete training lose network 
access) 
7) Must be fresh and new – new examples, new ideas, new concepts (adapt to new 
threats available) 
8) Must be continuous (always in employee’s minds) – it can be yearly online 
training, but with frequent emails, newsletters, security meet-ups, posters, boot-
camps, competitions (with incentives), meetings that start with a security 
message, etc. 
9) Incentive based (part of being important for employees as bottom line always 
matters) – regularly check employees’ knowledge in various security areas (e.g. 
through timed online surveys), score and average them every few months and 
award the employees with highest scores with additional monetary funds (similar 
to referrals)  
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10) Emphasize education (that can help them personally) and not testing – there is 
nothing to lose but much to gain.  
11) Stop and feel the pain – refers to a practice of simulating impacts of an attack, for 
example, shut down one of your (web) services and see how fast you can recover. 
This is just to show (mainly to decision-makers) that attacks can happen and if 
recovery, business continuity, and incident-handing plans are not in place and 
tested regularly, companies can experience big and very expensive consequences.  
12) Start early – this implies to companies, educational institutions and individuals 
alike. Companies should train their employees early and often (e.g. don’t allow 
network access until training is done). Education system, from elementary school 
to college and higher education, should be adjusted to raise awareness of security 
risks and protect youngster from being victims. Parents should know about 




8. Limitations and Future Work 
There are several limitations to this study. First, survey data was collected from a 
single IT company. On a related note, as the studied company is in the IT business, the 
workforce is heavily male-dominated and employees likely have higher overall technical 
and security knowledge than non-IT companies. Selection bias could have been also 
possible as this study could have attracted more tech-savvy employees compared to non 
tech-savvy ones. It is expected that because of these company features and possible 
selection bias, the number of employees who reported giving credentials on malicious 
sites or opening malicious attachments (15 out of 250) is not representative of companies 
at large. The results of the study might not hold true for other companies in different 
sectors that have a more diversified user base, which should be considered in future 
studies.  
Second, since the survey was online and not timed, for questions measuring 
knowledge of general and company-specific security policies, employees could have 
searched for answers online which could skew the results of the study. In future studies, it 
would be worthwhile checking the knowledge questions through a timed survey or in a 
lab-based isolated environment to see if similar results are found.  
Third, because of the point-in-time nature of data collection through a single 
survey, causality cannot be established. Future work should consider alternative methods 
to establish causality, such as longitudinal studies or experiments that capture baseline 
knowledge, then use a treatment such as various types of training, then measure 
knowledge again at a later time. Capturing data at least another survey six months or 
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longer from the first data collection would help establish reliability and validity of results 
(assuming everything else is constant). 
Fourth, a surprising finding was that security training was unrelated13 to all three 
major dependent variables, namely (1) being a security victim, (2) knowledge of security 
terms and concepts, and (3) knowledge of security policies. This could stem from the fact 
that various training characteristics such as the topic relevance and quality, mode of 
delivery and employee comprehension were not taken into consideration when 
determining the effects of security training on dependent variables (e.g. reading of the 
security policy could have been reported as security training). Additionally, there were 
measures not captured in this study (e.g., to capture the type of training received, when it 
was received, and the effectiveness of that training). Various training characteristics 
should be considered in future work.   
Finally, the adjusted R2 values, predicting all of the dependent variables 
(including sub-variables), are relatively low, ranging from ~3% to ~20%. This means that 
there are other factors at play (e.g., involving detailed security training) in predicting the 
likelihood of being a security victim, the knowledge of security terms and concepts, and 
the knowledge of security policies. Future work should consider finding additional 
factors to increase predictability for these dependent variables.  
  
                                                          




As employees are the weakest link in securing the organizational endpoints, the 
present study achieved its goal of determining the most common characteristics of 
employees who are a) most likely to be security victims, b) most knowledgeable about 
security concepts and c) most aware of the security policies when four different, yet 
intertwined, security risk areas (phishing, passwords, BYOD and laptop usage) are taken 
into account.  
Being aware of employee characteristics—who the literature and experts agree 
pose the biggest security risks for organizations—can help companies tailor their security 
awareness programs to ensure that “riskier” employees are given special attention when it 
comes to organizational security. This especially becomes important, as pointed out by 
security experts interviewed, as security victims are often the same people over and over 
again.  
Security experts interviewed pointed out that continuous education is the only 
“user firewall” that keeps organizations secure when it comes to their endpoints. One 
unintended consequence of this study is that the mere act of surveying employees has 
helped this process. The survey increased employees’ awareness around the most 
prominent human-related security threats as employees already started discussions about 
these topics among themselves and pointed out that they hope to see improvements in 
these areas as those are very much needed14. To further highlight that training is needed, 
82% of employees mentioned that the security training should be mandatory and 33.6% 
                                                          
14 This has been reported in the survey comment section. 
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of them emphasized that employees’ lack of education is the biggest threat in ensuring 
the security of corporate data.  
However, for security awareness programs, this is just the beginning [62]. Ideally, 
companies would look at recommendations and apply them but in real life, that is never 
the case. Security experts interviewed point out that often time security is an afterthought 
and is looked upon only after the incidents happen. Also, funding and staffing around 
security is always scarce and as one of the experts from educational sector points out: 
“There is always a lot of work but never enough people.” This further shows that 
management support and buy-in are very low, which can be proven by SANS Institute 
study that shows that only 5% of companies work on their security awareness programs 
full-time and spend less than $10,000 (or < $5,000 for smaller companies) per year on 
security awareness programs which is less than what is collected through bake sales [62]. 
Hence, for an organization to be truly security-oriented, the whole organizational 
culture needs to change and that needs to start from the top. Michael S. Huhn15 even 
suggested sending CEOs and top-level management to attend major security conferences, 
as that would provide valuable education to help them make decisions that would be in 
line with the security best practices. As security experts interviewed point out, when it 
comes to security attacks and breaches, it is the matter of when not if.  
Hopefully the literature reviewed, findings and recommendations from this study 
help organizations improve their security practices and help them see how important it is 
to invest in security matters, especially when it comes to the organizations’ most 
important assets—the employees.  
                                                          
15 Michael S. Huhn is an adjunct cybersecurity instructor at UMBC holding the following security 





Appendix A: Survey Questions 
Section 1: Current Security Awareness 
1) Security awareness refers to your awareness of security concerns that people and 
organizations face nowadays including phishing, passwords and the use of 
personal devices (smartphones, tablets, etc.) in everyday life. Overall, how would 
you rate your general information security awareness? (Slider: 1=very low, 
5=very high) 
 
2) Security policy refers to a company document that outlines the expected security 
behavior to be followed in the organizational setting. How would you rate your 
knowledge of your employer’s security policies? (Slider: 1=very low, 5=very 
high) 
[new page] 
The following set of questions will ask you about specific aspects of your employer’s 
security policy. Please answer to the best of your knowledge. 




4) If yes to 3, how often does the company security newsletter come out? 
a) About once a week 
b) About once a month 
c) About once a quarter 
d) About once a year 
e) I am not sure 
  




6) If yes to 5, how long has it been since your employer last updated its security 
policy? 
a) About one month 
b) About three months 
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c) About six months 
d) About a year 
e) I am not sure 
 
7) If yes to 5, how do you, MOST OFTEN, hear about the security policy updates? 
a) Security newsletter as part of corporate communication 
b) Colleagues 
c) Management 
d) Other (please list) 
 
8) If yes to 5, have you read the most current security policy? 
a) Yes, thoroughly 
b) I skimmed through it 
c) No, but I plan to read it  
d) No, and I hadn’t planned to read it 
 
9) If yes or skimmed to 8, did you understand the security policy? 
a) Yes, it is all straight forward 
b) So-so, I could use some explanations to better understand it 
c) No, I need help to understand it 
 
10) Have you received any security awareness training (HIPAA, phishing, passwords, 




11) If yes to 10, what kind of training have you received? (check all that apply) 
a) Self-interested online training 
b) Mandatory online training (e.g. HIPAA) 
c) In-person classroom training 
d) Other (please list) 
 
12) If yes to 10, what was the training topic? (check all that apply) 
a) Social engineering (phishing, spear phishing, etc.) 
b) HIPAA 
c) Password requirements 
d) Bring Your Own Device (BYOD) policies 
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e) Proper use of the company supplied laptop (passwords, patches, updates, 
downloads, etc.)  
f) Other (please describe) 
 
13) What is the current password expiration timeframe based on your employer’s 
password policy? 
a) 30 days 
b) 60 days 
c) 90 days 
d) 120 days 
e) There is no expiration 
 
14) What is the maximum number of password retries before your employer account 
(laptop, emails) gets locked? 






15) What is the current minimum password length for your organization?  
a) There is no minimum 
b) 5 characters 
c) 8 characters 
d) 10 characters 
e) 15 characters 
 
16) When you change your password on your employer-supplied laptop, what is the 











The following questions ask about your security-related experiences while working at 
your employer. 
Please answer to the best of your knowledge. 
 
17) A malicious site is any site used to disrupt computer operation, gather sensitive 
information, or gain access to private computer systems. Have you ever clicked 
on a link in the email from your employer-supplied laptop or client PC that took 
you to a malicious site? 
a) Yes, I clicked on the link in the email 
b) No, I never click the links I don’t trust 
c) I am not sure 
 
18) If yes to 17, did you provide your credentials on the site you were re-directed to? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) No credentials were requested 
 
19) If yes to 17, was there any impact to you, your organization or the client after 
clicking the link in the email? 
a) Yes (please describe)  
b) Not to my knowledge 
 
20) Malware is any software used to disrupt computer operation, gather sensitive 
information, or gain access to private computer systems. Have you ever opened an 
attachment on your employer-supplied laptop or client PC that installed malware? 
a) Yes 
b) No 
c) I am not sure 
 
21) If yes to 20, was there any impact to you, your organization or the client after 
opening the attachment? 
a) Yes (please describe) 
b) Not to my knowledge 
 
22) How long is your current employer password (laptop, email)? 
a) 5 -7 characters 
b) 8 - 10 characters 
c) 11 - 15 characters 
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d) 15+ characters 
 
23) Where do you generally store the passwords for various organizational systems 
(laptop, email, time entry, social collaboration, etc.)? (check all that apply) 
a) In my head (memory only) 
b) Sticky notes visible to others 
c) Sticky notes hidden from others 
d) Text file on the computer 
e) In the email received 
f) On my USB or external hard drive 
g) Password-protected document (Excel sheet) 
h) Password manager software (e.g., KeePass, 1Password) 
i) Other (please list) 
 
24) How do you mainly choose your password for various organizational systems? 
a) Meaningful detail (e.g. name, date, street, registration number, geographic 
location) 
b) Combination of meaningful details (e.g. Bill2000, 4jun84) 
c) Pronounceable password (e.g. one4you, 2Bfree) 
d) Random combination of characters (e.g. car8&t, CoLL186+) 
e) Not chosen by me. Please specify who chose it (e.g. work, provider)  
f) Other (please list) 
 
25) Have you ever used a random password generator for any of your organizational 




26) When creating a password in a work environment, what is your top priority? 
a) Strength and security 
b) Easy to remember 
c) Easy to enter 
d) Meeting password requirements 
 
27) Have you ever used your company password for any other personal accounts 















30) If yes to 29, generally, how often do you access work emails on your phone? 
a) All the time 
b) Few times a day 
c) Once a day 
d) Few days a week 
e) Less than few days a week 
 
31) If yes to 29, how do you access work emails on your phone? 
a) Through the Outlook app 
b) Through Outlook webmail 
c) Other (please list) 
 





e) Other (please list) 
 
33) If yes to 29, how do you protect (lock) your smartphone? 
a) Biometrics only 
b) Biometrics/pin or password 
c) Sliding pattern only 
d) Pin only 
e) Password only 
f) I do not lock my smartphone 
 
34) If 33=b,c,d,e, how many characters does your smartphone pin/password/pattern 
have? 
a) 4 digit numeric pin/pattern 
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b) 4+ digit numeric pin/pattern 
c) 0-5 character password 
d) 6-10 character password 
e) 10+ character password 
 
35) If 33=b,c,d,e, does your smartphone pin/password/pattern contain any of the 
below (check all that apply): 
a) Initial of, or full, your first name, last name or both 
b) Any or all parts of your birth date: day, month, year 
c) Initial of, or full, family member’s first name, last name or both 
d) Any or all parts of family member’s birth date: day, month, year 
e) None of the above 
 
36) If yes to 29, how often do you update the apps on your smartphone? 
a) As soon as updates are available 
b) Once a week or longer interval 
c) Once a month or longer interval 
d) Only when apps are updated automatically 
e) Never 
 




38) How often do you use your employer supplied laptop? 
a) Every day 
b) Every work day 
c) Few times a week 
d) Once a week or less 
e) Once a month or less 
 
39) How often do you apply updates to your employer-supplied laptop, for 
applications which are NOT updated automatically by the employer? 
a) As soon as I see them 
b) Once a week or longer interval 
c) Once a month or longer interval 




Section 2: Security Skills 
1) What is the goal of encrypted data transmission?  
a. The data can’t be eavesdropped 
b. The data is protected against viruses  
c. The data is not corrupted during transmission 
d. Only the user herself can see the data 
 
2) What is malware? 
a. Software which is not working properly  
b. Software which is automatically updating itself  
c. Software which is unwanted and might be harmful 
d. A faulty technical device 
 
3) What is phishing?  
a. The analysis of user’s browsing behavior 
b. The sending of unwanted ads 
c. The uninstalling of software that needs too much resources 
d. A form of deception using email or messaging in which an attacker 
attempts to fraudulently acquire sensitive information from a victim by 
impersonating a trustworthy entity 
 
4) What is social engineering?  
a. Distribution of software-testing tasks to several engineers in order to find 
security leaks 
b. Psychological manipulation of people into performing actions or divulging 
confidential information 
c. The development of software for social networks 
d. The development of charitable apps which are free of charge 
 
5) How can you recognize malicious emails (i.e., emails with suspicious links or 
attachments)? (check all that apply) 
a) By email sender 
b) By email subject 
c) By email content 
d) By the seeming urgency 
e) None of the above 
6) What helps you recognize a suspicious website? (check all that apply) 
a) Checking the URL 
b) Using toolbar tools like McAfee Site advisor or similar 
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c) Checking website safety ratings and reputation 
d) Checking the site’s digital certificate 
e) None of the above 
 
7) What makes the password strong? (check all that apply) 
a) Length 
b) Randomness 
c) Avoidance of dictionary words 
d) The use of alphanumeric and special characters 
e) None of the above 
 
8) How can a device (laptop, smartphone) be protected from viruses? (Check all that 
apply) 
a) Always keep software and OS up-to-date 
b) Avoid downloading unknown software (apps) from the Internet 
c) Use antivirus to scan your device often 
d) Avoid visiting unfamiliar or unknown websites  
e) Avoid using unsecured wireless networks 
f) None of the above 
 
9) How confident are you in your responses to above questions (1-8)?  
(Slider: 1=not confident at all, 5=very confident) 
Section 3: Challenges in securing corporate data and improving user awareness 
1) What do you see as the biggest challenge in ensuring the security of corporate 
data? 
a) Lack of employee education 
b) Lack of corporate communication (not being aware of things) 
c) Improper use of personal devices (e.g. smartphones, tablets, etc.) in the 
organizational setting  
d) Improper use of the company supplied laptop (passwords, patches, updates, 
downloads, etc.)  
e) Poor, or difficult to understand, security policy 
f) Other (please list) 
 
2) Please explain why you made the above selection.  
3) Which of the below security areas do you think are important to have employees 
trained on? (check all that apply) 
a) Social engineering (phishing, spear phishing, tailgating, piggy back rides, etc.) 
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b) Password requirements 
c) Proper use of personal devices (e.g. smartphones, tablets, etc.) in the 
organizational setting 
d) Proper use of the company supplied laptop (passwords, patches, updates, 
downloads, etc.)  
e) None of the above 
 




5) What would be the preferred method for you to receive security training? (check 
all that apply) 
a) Online self-learning (watching videos online, reading links from the Security 
newsletter, etc.)  
b) In person classroom training 
c) Real-world scenarios training (e.g. simulated phishing attacks) 
d) Other (please list) 
 
6) How often should the security training be offered? 
a) Every month 
b) Every 3 months 
c) Every 6 months 
d) Every year 
e) Less than once a year  
Section 4: Demographics and Conclusion 
1) Approximately how long have you been employed by your current employer?  
___Months   ___ Years 
 
2) What best describes the job role that you currently have? 
What describes the best your current job role? 
a) Finance 
b) Accounting 
c) Human Resources 
d) Office Management and Administration 
e) Sales 
f) Security 
g) Project Management 
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h) Business Analysis 
i) Testing 
j) IT (development, systems analysis and support, production support, etc.) 
k) Other (please list) 
 
3) What industry sector do you work in? 
a) Financial 
b) Healthcare 
c) Utilities  
d) Retail 
e) Other (please list) 
 
4) What is your age today? 
 




6) What is the highest degree you received? 
a) None 
b) Elementary school diploma 
c) High school diploma or equivalent (GED) 
d) Associate degree 
e) Bachelor’s degree 
f) Master’s degree 
g) Professional degree (MD, DDS, DVM, LLB, JD, DD) 
h) Doctorate degree (Ph.D., Ed.D.) 
 




8) If yes to 7, how many years of work experience do you approximately have 
working in a technical field (where technical work comprises a significant portion 
of your job)?  




9) How would you rate your overall technical knowledge (e.g. related to hardware 
and software components of the system)? 
(Slider: 1=very low, 5=very high) 
 
10) How would you rate your overall Web skills (e.g. searching and locating 
information, shopping online, online banking, etc.)? 
(Slider: 1=very low, 5=very high) 
 
11) How would you rate your knowledge of Internet-specific concepts (e.g. cache, 
cookies, phishing, digital certificates, trusted sites, etc.)? 
(Slider: 1=very low, 5=very high) 
 
12) Is there anything else that you would want to add, suggest or comment on?  
 
[new page] 
Below are the questions that you marked as “I am not sure” as your answer. To help us 
understand your selection, could you please briefly explain what made you choose that as 
your answer?  [Note: SurveyGizmo will pull those questions in and list them for the 
participant] 
[new page] 
Thank you for your participation in this survey. Your responses will help to identify areas 





Appendix B: Interview Questions 
1) What are the most common types of security incidents that your company/clients 
are facing? What percentage of incidents on average are related to human factor 
(phishing, passwords, BYOD, laptop/computer maintenance, etc.)? 
2) What do you see nowadays as the biggest challenges in ensuring the security of 
corporate data? 
3) What are some of the biggest challenges your company or clients face? 
4) Do you see phishing as a big threat to companies nowadays and in upcoming 
future? Why or why not? 
5) How can phishing threats be mitigated or prevented? 
6) What do you consider as a strong password policy? How can that be enforced? 
7) Do you think that employee password choices often times put a company at risk? 
8) How can password related threats be mitigated? (Password length, complexity, 
random passwords) 
9) Do you think BYOD policy is a threat to organizational security? Why or why 
not? 
10) How can BYOD policy be enforced? (How can you check that your employees 
actually have pins/passwords on the smartphone?) 
11) How can threats related to BYOD be mitigated and prevented? 
12) When an organization gives you a laptop to use (new laptops are lockdown, older 
one not), what are your biggest concerns related to security? 
13) How can those concerns be mitigate and prevented? 
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14) Based on your experience, how are user awareness programs implemented within 
various organizations?  
15) What are the characteristics of good user awareness programs? What are the 
characteristics of bad ones? 
16) How can company employees see the benefit of the security awareness programs 
and be actively involved in creating the security culture? 
17) What are the few things that companies must do at a minimum do operate 




Appendix C: Correlation Matrix for Dependent and Independent Variables 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
1. Security Victim 
Likelihood (DV) 
1               
2. Actual Security 
Knowledge (DV) 
-.11 1              
3. Security Policy 
Knowledge (DV) 
-.09 .06 1             
4. Sex .21** -.20** .03 1            
5. Age -.16* -.05 .19** -.17* 1           
6. Education .06 .08 .02 -.22** .11 1          
7. Security Training -.01 .06 .09 .01 .04 .08 1         
8. Years Employed .01 -.08 .12 -.01 .33** -.05 -.17** 1        
9. Job Role -.13* .19** -.02 -.17** -.10 .01 .07 -.19** 1       
10. Industry Sector -.11 .08 .02 -.16* -.03 -.11 -.02 -.16* .00 1      
11. Internet Knowledge  -.27** .23** .01 -.25** .04 .17** .09 -.11 .31** .09 1     
12. Technical 
Background 
-.12 .18** -.04 -.32** .05 .14* .04 -.10 .52** .05 .44** 1    
13. Perceived Technical 
Knowledge  
-.28** .28** .03 -.46** .14* .13* .09 -.05 .41** .11 .65** .53** 1   
14. Perceived Security 
Awareness 
-.30** .09 .23** -.16* .19** .12 .18** .00 .15* .07 .49** .21** .40** 1  
15. Perceived Security 
Policy Knowledge 
-.36** -.04 .33** .05 .23** .04 .26** .01 -.05 .02 .19** -.05 .15* .52** 1 
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